[2.6. Agro-Joint activities going down by
industrialization since 1930 - schools]
[1933: Jewish farmer settlements
not attractive any more]
The growth of industry, on one hand, and the repeated disasters of
Soviet agriculture, on the other, made agricultural settlement
considerably less attractive to Russian Jews. Settlement was much lower
in 1933; after 1934 no more claims are made of families settling on
land in the Crimea, the Ukraine, or White Russia. JDC claimed that
altogether 14,036 families had been settled in its (p.83)
colonies by 1934. There are some doubts as to the accuracy of the
figure, but it can serve as a general indication of the extent of the
colonization effort.
[Agro-Joint trade schools and
training courses]
One other aspect of JDC work in Russia was of great importance in the
history of Russian Jewry: the development of trade schools and training
courses. There were several of these.
[Agro-Joint's trade schools -
Odessa: Children's home becomes trade school - Agro-Joint schools
become part of the Russian industrialization]
But the most interesting one was Evrabmol in Odessa. this had started
as an orphans' home after World War I, under the directorship of P.M.
Kaganovsky. It acquired land on the outskirts of Odessa and established
a training farm. Later the home moved back into the city and became a
technical school. The children, some of whom did not even know the
names of their parents, were saved from life in the streets and the
catacombs of Odessa and became useful citizens.
Beginning in the early 1920s Evrabmol was supported by JDC and became
an eminently successful school; in l1929/30 it began to pay its own way
by selling the products of its shops. It then became attached to the
Commissariat (Ministry) of Heavy Industry and, with the benevolent help
of the Odessa town soviet (municipality), continued to develop to the
satisfaction of everyone concerned.
Evrabmol, two other institutions in Odessa, and schools and courses at
Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolaev, and other places had some 8,580 students in
1930. These schools and courses, originally under the Commissariat of
Education, were transferred to the industrial commissariats in the
course of the five-year plan.
This meant that the Agro-Joint was playing a certain part in the
absorption of Jewish youths into the swiftly growing industry, despite
its failure to establish the industrialization program with significant
American financial help. The attempt was made to direct the student
toward heavy industry, mainly the metal industry, in such new trades as
that of automobile mechanic. These were high-priority areas in Soviet
industrialization, and had the Jews stuck to their traditional trades,
their chances of partaking in the tremendous revolution that was going
on would have diminished considerably.
Another factor has to be considered. In 1931 the Soviet government
began a series of economic negotiations with Western governments. (p.84)
[Foreign technicians at the
schools give motivation for pupils]
At the same time, foreign technicians came in in rather significant
numbers, and the attitude toward technicians and experts generally was
little short of adulation in Russia. Wage differentials between these
experts and ordinary citizens grew swiftly, and Jewish trainees were
encouraged to dream of becoming members of this favored class. The
efforts of Agro-Joint to establish, maintain, and equip trade schools,
apart from or in cooperation with the ORT schools, must be seen against
that general background. Government encouragement and interest in these
schools was very obvious, and, as industrialization proceeded, so did
the hunger of Soviet industry for skilled workers. By the time the
government took these schools over from the Agro-Joint in 1935, there
were 42 of them, some operating at a very high level of training.
[Odessa: Vinchevsky Technical
School - training in Kremenchug]
Two of these schools should be mentioned here. One was the Vinchevsky
Technical School in Odessa, and the other was a special training course
instituted in the town of Kremenchug. The Vinchevsky School was
actually the continuation of one of the Jewish trade schools that had
been set up during the czarist regime. The Soviets had taken over this
school, and the Agro-Joint developed it into one of the most important
technical schools in the Ukraine.
(End note 32: AJ 2, Rosen's letter, March 1936)
[Agro-Joint shops for Jewish
lishentsy to get out of the banned status]
Also, in their shops the mutual aid societies trained artisans who were
thus enabled to escape their
lishentsy
status and eventually to enter government factories. An interesting
example of this is provided by the development in Georgia, in the
Caucasus. There, Georgian Jews formed a mutual aid society in 1929,
with an initial capital of 16 rubles (officially, $ 8). The Agro-Joint
stepped in, and with its help 82 artels were organized by 1931,
employing 2,568 persons, of whom 2,053 were Jews. The chief trades were
knitting and needlework, reflecting the occupational structure of
Georgian - but not just Georgian - Jewry.
(End note 33: AJ 20)
[Agro-Joint schools are factor for
job changing and integration of Jews into Soviet industry]
In the course of its industrial activity, Agro-Joint made a conscious
effort to direct Jews away from their traditional occupations. The
production of lathes and other machinery at Evrabmol, the production of
dental burrs at Kiev - these efforts were made with (p.85)
a clearly formulated aim of helping to change the occupational
structure of Russian Jewry. Ultimately, however, the relative success
of this occupational change depended on whether the Jews could be
"fitted into the general structure of the economic and social life of
the country."
(End note 34: AJ 2, Rosen's letter, March 1936)
This the government did, and it was the economic revolution of the
five-year plan rather than any Jewish effort that enabled the Jews to
be absorbed in the newly created industrial structure.
The Agro-Joint helped in this process, eased the transition, and spared
many Jews a great deal of privation. But it must be recognized that it
was not because of any accomplishment by the Agro-Joint that some
350,000 Jews became factory workers in the course of the first
five-year plan. This fact was fully recognized by Rosen, and he was to
draw certain conclusions from it.
[1934: Industrialization is fixed
- Agro-Joint is less needed]
By 1934 Agro-Joint industrial work was completed. Soviet industry had
become a giant, still rather unsteady on its huge feet, but a giant all
the same. The help of a foreign organization dealing specifically with
transitional problems could be dispensed with. The 644 shops of the aid
societies were still employing 8,278 workers, and this included the 66
aided by Agro-Joint. These were taken over by the government in 1934.
At the same time, in October 1934, the Ukrainian Red Cross absorbed the
medical societies under an agreement that insured equal treatment to
the lishentsy. By that time the whole lishentsy problem had been
solved, to all intents and purposes. Only some religious and older
people (less than 5 % of the Jewish population) were still affected,
and there was no longer any justification for maintaining a large
administration and special institutions for these unfortunate people.
Members of their families could supply them with the bare necessities
of life, and though their position was far from pleasant, JDC's help no
longer seemed necessary.
[1932: Agro-Joint's funds melt
down by depression in the "USA" - death of Rosenwald on 6 Jan 1932]
In the meantime, as a result of the economic disaster that had struck
America, subscribers found it harder and harder to honor their
subscriptions. By 1932 the situation had become critical. It must be
remembered that JDC's collections went down to a low of $ 385,000 in
1932, and budgets were cut most cruelly at a time (p.86)
when the need was overwhelming. Only the agricultural work in Russia,
secured as it was by individual contractual subscriptions, continued.
The society supplied its $ 1 million yearly and thus enabled Rosen to
continue his work. This unique situation could not continue, and in
1932 AMSOJEFS found that it would have to cease payments.
[At the same time Stalin is laughing at capitalism in it's depression
of bourse speculation].
The direct cause for this disaster was the death, on January 6, 1932,
of Julius Rosenwald, whose wealth had been invested largely in stocks.
The probate of his will was a very complicated affair, and the claims
of tax collectors and creditors had to be settled before payments of
AMSOJEFS could be expected. In fact, there was the real danger that
with the devaluation of stocks, the estate would have difficulties in
satisfying the demands of both creditors and tax people. Payments on
the subscriptions to AMSOJEFS were out of the question. In this
situation the leaders of JDC entrusted to Rosen the delicate task of
negotiating with the Soviet government a new agreement, which would
prelude the actual cash payment of any more money by American
subscribers.
Rosen's trump card was the amount of ruble assets JDC had accumulated
in Russia and which JDC had at least a theoretical right to take out in
dollars.
[1930-1932: Stalin's regime does
not need foreign organizations any more - restrictions]
But by 1932 the Russians were no longer as eager to negotiate with a
foreign organization as they had been before. Rumblings against foreign
organizations had been heard before, and as early as December 11, 1929,
Grower had declared to JTA that "some minor people agitate against
foreign organizations without any hope of success in responsible
circles."
(End note 35: AJ 4)
These agitations turned out not to be so minor after all, and
Diamanstein, leader of the Yevsektsia, had some very harsh things to
say about the Agro-Joint at an OZET Congress in 1930. "Agro-Joint does
not understand Soviet policy and does not want to understand it." He
said that the Soviet people needed to utilize these organizations,
especially as they had agreements with the Soviet government, but he
added that the government authorities must supervise these
organizations to insure that they were under the proper direction.
(End note 36: AJ 59, JTA [Jewish
Telegraphic Agency] report, December 1930)
This was too much for Rosen. At the beginning of 1931 he wrote (p.87)
a very strong letter to COMZET about the active campaign against the
Agro-Joint. To his complaint Rosen added a threat: "The people at the
head of our organization have no desire whatsoever to impose our work
on anybody and it is entirely out of the question for us to be in a
position of a 'tolerated' organization."
(End note 37: AJ 11, 1/30/31 [30 January 1931])
The answer, signed by Smidovich, was sent after discussions with the
government, and apparently the extremists were defeated. "The articles
and speeches of private individuals", the COMZET letter of February 16,
1930, said, "do not in any way reflect the attitude of the government
toward the work of the Agro-Joint."
While this was a clear repudiation of the position of the Communist
Left, undercurrents in the party against the Agro-Joint grew stronger.
In April 1931 Lubarsky was arrested and spent a month in prison before
Rosen managed to get him out. In 1932 the Soviets were ready to reduce
the Agro-Joint work in Russia by stages.
(End note 38: AJ 11, AJ 90)
[1932 appr.: JDC claims that SU
regime has not fulfilled the agreement of 1929 - but there is more SU
money in the Agro-Joint colonies than foreseen]
At first JDC gave some consideration to the idea of camouflaging their
lack of ability to pay by suing the USSR for not having fulfilled the
contract conditions, in accordance with an arbitration clause in the
1929 agreement. This clause was based on the principle of
rebus sic stantibus: the agreement
was held to have been violated by the government's having changed, by
its policy of collectivization, the conditions under which the
Agro-Joint conducted the work. Farm settlements in Russia would have
been considerably less attractive in the eyes of Jewish subscribers in
the United States had they known that their money would in fact go into
the kolkhoz settlements. In the end, however, JDC refrained from any
attempt to sue the Russians. The work was deemed to have succeeded
after all, and the Russian government had certainly fulfilled the
financial conditions; in fact, they had spent considerably more in
rubles on Agro-Joint colonies than they had been bound by contract to
do.
By 1933, $ 4,857,563 was actually paid on the subscriptions, of which
the Rosenwald share amounted to about $ 3 million of the $ 5 million
promised. The sum of $ 4,725,000 had actually been sent to Russia, and
$ 2,475,000 was still to come under the original (p.88) eight-year
agreement (1928 to 1935).
[14 April 1933: New agreement
between JDC and the Soviet regime]
On April 14, 1933, Rosen sighed a new agreement with the Soviet
government. The Soviets had given AMSOJEFS bonds for the money they had
actually received, which they would ultimately have to redeem. Interest
was also to be paid up to the end of the eight-year contract. They now
accepted a part of these bonds and waived payment of interest in lieu
of the money the society owed them. After that, part of the bonds for
the money they had received from America still remained in the hands of
AMSOJEFS. They now issued bonds for the $ 2,475,000 they had received
through the new agreement, and thus left AMSOJEFS with $ 5,352,000 in
Soviet bonds bearing a 5 % interest.
(End note 39:
The total amount of interest the Soviets would have had to pay on the $
4,725,000 until the end of 1935 was $ 627,000. This they accepted as
payment from AMSOJEFS. In addition, AMSOJEFS handed back to the Soviets
Soviet bonds in the amount of $ 1,848,000 out of the $ 4,725,000 in
bonds that the Soviets had given AMSOJEFS when they received the money
from America. Together, these two sums came to $ 2,475,000 which
AMSOJEFS owed the Soviet government. For these bonds and waiver of
interest which was worth dollar payment, the Soviets issued new bonds
($ 2,475,000) which, together with the $ 2,877,000 in bonds that had
remained in the hands of AMSOJEFS after the $ 1,848,000 had been paid,
made for a total of $ 5,352,000 in Soviet bonds, which were partly
repaid and partly returned by agreement by the end of 1940. The 1933
agreement was, of course, extremely favorable to AMSOJEFS).
at the same time an agreement was reached on the Agro-Joint assets in
Russia. Assets worth 5.6 million rubles were handed over to the
government, and the government in turn gave the Agro-Joint the
equivalent in cash and credits. The Agro-Joint promised to use the
money for intensive plantation programs, various kinds of training
courses, administration, and other items.
The agreement was profitable to both sides. The Agro-Joint was relieved
of the need to supply more cash, and the Russians obtained a firm legal
hold over the Agro-Joint estates in their country, improved their
financial arrangement with the society, and at the same time began the
process of an orderly termination of the society's affairs in their
country.
[Since 1933: Agro-Joint activities
going down in Russia]
The end had clearly arrived. As we have seen, the possibilities of
agricultural settlement in Russia were decreasing rapidly. Rosen
claimed that in 1933 only 1,400 families were settled in the Crimea,
but even this looked rather doubtful.
(End note 40: AJ 2, 4/14/34 [14 April 1934])
Jews now did not have to go to the Crimea in order to become
small-scale farmers on the outskirts of villages and towns, but could
do so wherever they lived. The Jewish economic position continued to
improve, and the Agro-Joint and its operations seemed to be more and
more superfluous.
[1931: Ukraine: Agro-Joint
liquidated by industrialization]
In 1931 the Ukrainian work was liquidated, the Agro-Joint having simply
been told that they had nothing more to do there. (p.89)
(End note 41: AJ 11, 4/30/31 [30 April 1931])
[1932-1934: Crimea: Agro-Joint
experts on Jewish settlements]
In 1932-34, work was concentrated in the Crimea. Government supervision
in all respects except the purely agroeconomic one was complete. Some
of the assets of the Agro-Joint were not, it s true, handed over:
for example, the Jankoy tractor station and repair shop, buildings in
Simferopol and Moscow, supplies, and commodities. Even after the
termination of its actual settlement work in 1934, the Agro-Joint still
maintained a large staff of experts who, with income from the existing
assets and some very small sums in dollars, continued to advise the
settlements about their agricultural production. The Jankoy station was
one of the prototypes of the MTS tractor stations that were to provide
tractor work for the kolkhozy later on. In other respects too, such as
well-drilling and horticulture, Agro-Joint help was still significant.
But Rosen's absences from Russia grew longer and longer, and the work
was slowly reduced to a minimum.
[1937: Agro-Joint in Russia is
going down]
In 1937 the Agro-Joint still had 6 million rubles' worth of assets, but
its staff (which at the peak of colonization numbered some 3,000
employees) had dwindled to about 100.
The fact that the Agro-Joint's presence was becoming undesirable in
1937/8 was made very evident. This was the time of the purges, and it
was unthinkable that a foreign organization like the Agro-Joint would
be allowed to carry on much longer. Smidovich died in 1935 and was
succeeded by a Stalinist bureaucrat named Chuchkaieff. The end was near.
