[2.11. Final
discussion about the sense of the Agro-Joint work and the Jewish
colonies in Russia]
[1940: Baerwald's question where
the Jewish colonies are]
As to the colonies, they [the members of Agro-Joint after 1937] seemed
to have suffered a great deal under the impact of the terror. Equally
important in their lack of success was the pull of the towns and their
growing industries. Baerwald stated in 1940 that "Weizmann says (that)
Russian colonization has not proved a success. Most people have left
(the) colonies as he always said they would. Have you any definite news
or views on numbers still remaining in (the) colonies?"
(End note 53: AJ 25, 2/20/40 [20 February 1940])
There was no answer. Weizmann apparently had been right. Then the flood
came, and the Jewish colonies were wiped off the face of the earth by
Hitler's hordes.
[Addition: There were Stalin deportations 1939-1941 and there was the
Big Flight before in 1941 to the inner of the Soviet Union so many Jews
could be saved, about 1 mio. minimum].
[Rosen: Without Agro-Joint Jewry
in Russia would have perished]
Evaluation of the Agro-Joint work presents a very complicated problem.
Rosen's dictum was that if JDC had not turned to colonization work,
great numbers of Russian Jews "would undoubtedly (p.99)
have literally perished. While at present the government would
undoubtedly continue the work, should the Agro-Joint terminate, it
would not have started it without our initiative and our actually
originating it."
(End note 54: AJ 66, 10/8/31 [8 October 1931])
The first part of the statement is probably true as regards those
10,000 or 12,000 families settled by the Agro-Joint before the relative
improvement of conditions in the early 1930s. The second part is more
doubtful. But there is no doubt that tens of thousands of Jews were
saved from economic disaster by being settled on the land. This itself
enabled the Agro-Joint to do its so-called "non-Agro" work, and that
alleviated conditions all over the former Pale of Settlement.
[Balance: Results of Agro-Joint
work]
The medical institutions, the trade schools, the various kassas and aid
societies - they were all by-products of the colonies, and they were a
blessing to hundreds of thousands of human beings in a very difficult
situation. The very presence of an American Jewish organization was of
great value and should not be underestimated.
The reinstatement of the Jewish
lishentsy
in June 1930, the change in attitude toward the mutual aid societies,
the opportunities for help to the Zionist pioneers, on one hand, and
Orthodox rabbis and some of their followers on the other, the hundreds
that were enabled to leave Russia because of Rosen's intervention - all
these must be taken into account.
[Motives of motivation for
supporting
the Agro-Joint work]
What were the motivations of the people who supported this work - apart
from their having been influenced by the truly great personality of
Rosen? They were mostly men of rather limited social and political
vision, but of great sincerity and considerable wealth. They were
rarely in the mood for philosophizing, but William Rosenwald's account
of his father's motivation contains a most interesting philosophy:
He believed that Jews, given an
opportunity to become productive, self-supporting citizens in their
native lands, would succeed. He wanted to show that Jews can earn their
livelihood by the sweat of their brows. He believed that emigration
could not solve the (p.100)
mass problem of Jews in Eastern and Central Europe. So he welcomed the
opportunity afforded in Soviet Russia for Jews to prove that they could
be self-supporting farmers and industrial workers on a large scale.
These achievements, under Rosen's guidance, were thought of as
permanent improvements, not palliative measures.
(End note 55: AJ 62a, February 1938)
Several attitudes were inextricably interwoven in this statement by
Rosenwald: the feeling of inferiority of the Western Jew toward his
surroundings, contained
-- in the hope that the Jews could be just as good as others, given the
opportunity (not that they were as good, but that they would have to
prove they were, because prima facie they were not);
-- the belief that Eastern and Central European Jews should stay where
they were, especially since there was no practical possibility for them
to go anywhere els;
-- and the inherent romanticism of a wealthy American Jew cooperating
with the Soviet authorities in turning the Jew into a farmer and
peasant.
[And the SU government lets help and gets it's profit by the help].
19 century liberalism and Jewish Reform and a great deal of goodwill
cooperated to produce this attitude.
[Anti-Zionism as a pre-condition
for Agro-Joint's existence in Russia]
Of course, anti-Zionism entered the field as well. Lessing Rosenwald,
as we have seen, was not opposed to a Jewish state in Biro-Bidjan -
that would be a Bolshevik creation owing allegiance to the Soviet
Union, and would not embarrass a Western Jew politically. But Zionism
was different, and "should a national homeland be established in
Palestine, I believe it would be one of the greatest catastrophes that
could possibly happen."
(End note 56: Executive Committee, 9/20/38 [20 September 1938])
Dr. Maurice B. Hexter, a moderate supporter of JDC who was a
non-Zionist and worked with the Jewish Agency in the upbuilding of
Palestine in the 1930s, expressed the opinion that "it would be an
inhuman blunder to arouse hopes in the breasts of our unfortunate
brethren, to imply and to state that Palestine can solve their entire
problems, even if one has faith (I for one do not have it) in the
astronomic predictions of the absorptive capacity of either Palestine
as a whole, or of the portion proposed for the Jewish state under the
partition. There would still remain hundreds of thousands (p.101)
who would not be taken care of and for whom other outlets must be
sought."
(End note 57: Palestine Post, 3/3/38 [3 March 1938])
Warburg and Baerwald did not share the extreme anti-Zionism of Lessing
Rosenwald; the cooperated with Weizmann of the Jewish Agency, whom they
admired and in a way feared. But they were equally opposed to the
radical nationalism of the majority of the Zionist movement. Besides,
they too could not see how little Palestine could solve the problem of
East European Jewry. Agro-Joint work at least helped solve the Russian
Jews' economic problem. It might be a beacon to follow, and Polish Jews
might perhaps go the same route.
They were all subject to the limitation that Rosen himself labored
under, when he declared that "there is no specific Jewish problem in
Russia anymore."
(End note 58: AJ - uncatalogued materials; file: Russia, settlement of
emigrants, 1935, draft verbatim notes of informal meeting, 6/15/35
[15 June 1935], Rosen's speech, p.3)
[The main thing: Economic help to
self-help]
They all saw Russian Jewry in purely economic terms. Even in those
terms they only saw the present, and failed to consider the
implications inherent in Soviet economic development. With the pull of
the cities and the lack of an ideological counterpull, the town-bound
tradition of the Jews would induce them to abandon agricultural areas
as long as there was no compelling economic reason to remain. only an
insignificant proportion at best would remain on the land surrounded by
farmers of other nationalities. This would probably have been true even
had there been no German invasion [and of the NS allies]. But the point
is that Jewish existence did not consist solely of economic factors,
important as these were.
When Warburg was asked to comment on the persecution of rabbis in the
Soviet Union, he answered that while he deeply deplored this situation,
one must not forget that the Soviet government was helping the Jews get
back on their feet economically. The philanthropist saw the problem
almost solely in terms of bread and butter. The faith of the nation,
its cultural and political freedom, its past values and future hopes -
whether Orthodox or secular, liberal or Zionist - were of marginal
concern. The Reform Jew wanted to break down the barriers between the
Jew and his neighbor, whereas the Russian Jews by and large clung to
certain vestiges of separateness. (p.102)
[Jewish development away from
industry to government jobs]
In the end, the breakdown of barriers did not succeed. Jews left not
only agriculture but also, to an ever-increasing extent, factory work
as well. They concentrated in the Commissariats of Trade and Commerce,
in the professions, in the bureaucracies of the industrial
establishment and their accounting departments.
[The question: Was Agro-Joint
worth the money?]
In the long run the Agro-Joint work in Russia brought few results. What
of the short run? Was it worth spending $ 16 million between 1924
and 1938 for that purpose?
(End note 59: AJ 2, reports, résumé by M.A. Leavitt, 3/20/45 [20
March 1945])
A very good case can be made that this was not only good, but
essential. Others have pointed out that this money could have been used
in Palestine to better purpose, but what better purpose was there than
saving Jews from hunger? Was it, after all, possible to take the Jews
out of Russia and send them to Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s? If
not, what should Jewish philanthropists have done with them? There was
certainly a case to be made, then and later, for concentrating all
efforts solely on Palestine. But not very many, even in the Zionist
camp, dared to put a Palestine-centered demand quite as exclusively as
that. Rosen settled 60,000 Jews on the land. This was considerably more
than the agricultural settlement in Palestine had achieved in the
comparable period, working without government help and with less
expertise than Rosen's team could command.
[Balance: Figures of Jewish
settlements by Agro-Joint]
The final results of the colonization work were themselves rather
unclear. How many families did the Agro-Joint settle in Russia? The
figure is apparently close to 60,000 persons. The estimates vary
between 14,000 to 20,000 families, but it is reasonably certain that
not more than 14,000 families remained on the land by 1938, probably
considerably less than that. Kahn's estimate was that the total Jewish
farming population in 1941 amounted to some 160,000 persons and that
some 70,000 more were connected to the land by having vegetable plots
on the outskirts of towns and villages. It seems to us that of these,
some 50,000 to 60,000 had been settled by the Agro-Joint.
(End note 60: Based on AJ 2, reports, résumé by B. Hahn, 10/31/44 [31th
October 1944]; ibid., statement of Russian activities, 3/16/34 [16
March 1934]; file 35a, report by M.C. Troper, 12/10/36 [10 December
1936])
[Crimea 1934: Foundation of big
Jewish settlements]
In about 1934 a consolidation of the tracts settled by the Jewish
settlers in the Crimea took place. Villages were united under a common
administration, and five autonomous Jewish districts (p. 103)
were founded (Freidorf in February 1931, Stalindorf in June 1930,
Kalinindorf in March 1937, New Zlatopol in 1929, and Larindorf in
January 1935).
[Last hope: Opening of the
documents]
This was the sum total of the work that ended in the eviction of the
Agro-Joint and in the arrest and death of most, possibly all, of its
Russian Jewish officials. There were achievements and there were
disasters. The full story will have to wait until the Agro-Joint files
in Russia are opened to scholarly inspection at some future date.
