As we have seen, the crisis in
Germany did not find JDC entirely unprepared. The warnings of Dr. Kahn
and the rumblings of the rising Nazi tide in Germany had focused the
attention of the organization upon the German scene even before the
advent of Hitler. Once the Nazis came to power, it was only natural
that JDC should try to come to the aid of German Jewry. However, the
attitude of JDC was contested within the inner circle of its own
leadership - this despite the fact that most of its lay leaders were
descendants of German Jewish immigrants to the U.S. or had themselves
been born in Germany.
[1933: Discussions in the JDC
about actions in Nazi Germany]
During the first months of 1933, discussions of whether JDC should
enter
the German picture at all were held in New York. Arthur Hays Sulzberger
of the New York Times thought that JDC was
making a fundamental and woeful
blunder in this connection. It seems to me impossible to conceive that
600,000 persons in Germany can be supported from now on from any
outside community. Since this obligation cannot be carried out, it
should not be assumed. To do so, in my judgment, merely relieved the
German Government of its responsibility that now rests upon it to
permit its citizens an equality to earn their own livelihood.
(End note 1: Arthur Sulzberger to Max J. Kohler, 5/29/33 [29 May
1933], CON 21
At a Board of Directors meeting in July, James N. Rosenberg argued that
there was no point in providing relief for the Jews in (p.105)
Germany, because JDC simply did not have the means to do so. The aim of
the organization should be to get the German government to agree to a
program of reconstruction. In this, JDC might be of some help.
(End note 2: James N. Rosenberg at Board of Directors meeting, 7/11/33
[11th July 1933])
The majority of the organization's leaders, however, adopted Dr.
Bernhard Kahn's attitude that "the liberal principle in business had
met its end in Germany", and that JDC must help German Jews enter into
those economic fields in which they were still allowed. He was
certainly in favor of constructive efforts in Germany: "Even if a
district attorney can only open a stenographic office, that is surely
better than if these people leave the country and go completely to
wrack and ruin."
But Kahn was very much against limiting JDC help to reconstruction
only. He foresaw the necessity of providing funds to create new schools
for Jewish children. At the same time, he thought that Palestine was
at least a partial answer to those who could no longer stay in Germany:
"Jewish youth and the younger adult must have a permanent land to which
to go and, under the circumstances, this can only be Palestine. Of
course, exceptionally large amounts are required for the preparation of
Palestine and the work for this preparation. For this purpose special
means must be provided."
(End note 3: Dr. Bernhard Kahn at an Executive Committee meeting,
6/27/33 [27 June 1933])
The first immediate problem as far as Germany was concerned was
political. Zionists and others demanded protests in the form of Jewish
mass meetings. Kahn's opinion was expressed after meeting Morris D.
Waldman, the secretary of the American Jewish Committee. He thought
that Jewish mass meetings would be useless and might even be harmful.
However, he foresaw a time when such meetings, particularly with the
participation of prominent non-Jews, might become necessary.
(End note 4: Kahn cable to New York, 3/19/33 [19 March 1933], 14-47)
In the ensuing months he was to stick to this opinion. On March 21,
1933, Paul Baerwald cabled to the State Department in Washington,
asking that American protection be given to the JDC offices in Berlin.
That same day, the American Jewish Committee and the B'nai B'rith of
America published a protest against Hitler that was published in the
New York Times. This apparently was
considered to be a moderate form of (p.106)
public intervention; friends of JDC in Germany (for example, Edward
Baerwald, brother of Paul Baerwald) were opposed to more militant
protests.
(End note 5: Eduard Baerwald to New York, 3/19/33 [19 March 1933],
ibid [14-47])
[1933: Kahn is warned to leave
Berlin - Kahn returns to New York]
It was soon clear to Kahn that his position as the European director of
JDC was untenable as long as he remained in Berlin. During the last
days of March, Kahn prepared his departure. On April 1 he cabled from
Paris that the removal of his offices had become unavoidable. He had
been personally warned, semiofficially, that because of his connection
with the widely hated American Jewish community, his departure from
Germany would be desirable. He added: "Future passing of German border
not possible without special visa which I very likely would not get;
nevertheless prepared return by end week." He never stood on German
soil again.
(End note 6: Kahn to New York, 4/1/33 [1 April 1933], ibid. [14-47])
[1933: Discussions about protests
and interventions of the Red Cross]
The next day, April 2, Kahn asked for protest meetings along
nonsectarian lines, emphasizing the humanitarian interest in what was
happening in Germany. However, such protests were to take place only if
negotiations then in progress between influential Jews in London and
the Nazis were fruitless. Joseph C. Hyman went to Washington to see
William Phillips and Pierrepont Moffat at the State Department with
this message on April 4. On April 6 a meeting was held at the home of
Paul Baerwald, where the leadership of the German Jewish aristocracy in
the United States convened. Participants included Henry Morgenthau,
Jr., Ludwig Fogelstein, Irving Lehman, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Judge
Rosenman, Solomon Lowenstein, James Marshall, Frederick M. Warburg,
Judge Proskauer, Jonah B. Wise, and others. The suggestion was made
that the whole situation be turned over to the International Red Cross,
but the argument was advanced that IRC could not act except through the
local societies of the Red Cross, which would mean that in practice the
German Red Cross would have to intervene more or less against the
wishes of the German government.
Proskauer, Lehman, and others were very much against what they called
"separatist Jewish protests", and wanted whatever protests (p.107)
were made to remain on a purely humanitarian and nonsectarian level.
(End note 7: Meeting at the home of Paul Baerwald, 4/6/33 [6 April
1933], ibid. [14-47])
[Funds to the Hilfsverein CV]
Kahn was asked by cable whether funds could be sent into Germany. His
first reply on April 12 was that funds could indeed be sent and that
the best people to handle such funds would be the Hilfsverein or CV
(Central-Verein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens), the
political organization of liberal Jewry in Germany.
[The Joint has no right to
demonstrate]
As a nonpolitical organization, JDC could not be involved in any
demonstrations against German persecution of the Jews. Such protests,
if made, had to be left to the American Jewish Committee, whose
leadership, as we have seen, was to a certain extend identical with
that of JDC.
[April 1933: British Jews want
that Felix M. Warburg will make pressure on British prime Minister
MacDonald who will be in "USA"]
Influential British Jews tried to convince Felix M. Warburg to put
pressure on the American government to try to influence the British
government to intervene in behalf of German Jewry. The British prime
Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, was in the United States during the latter
part of April, but Warburg did not place much hope on any direct
contact that Jewish leaders might have with the British premier.
(End note 8: F.M. Warburg to Lord Reading, 4/22/33 [22th April 1933],
ibid. [14-47])
[Kahn: JDC has to defend every
Jewish position in Germany]
The immediate problem confronting JDC was what to do about the new
situation that had arisen in Germany. The first reaction was well
summed up by Dr. Kahn, who wrote in the memorandum from which we have
already quoted that he was of the opinion that JDC could not give up
German Jewry as completely lost. JDC had to defend to the last every
position that the Jews still held in Germany.
(End note 9: Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden, Dr. Kahn's material,
1931-1940, memo of 6/27/33 [27 June 1933])
[Hyman states that the young
German-Jewish generation has to be prepared for emigration]
This did not mean that JDC was opposed to the emigration of large
numbers of German Jews. The panic exodus that followed the Nazis'
assumption of power would have made any such position hopeless in any
case. The policy of JDC was enunciated clearly by Hyman when he said
that, in line with the wishes of the German Jewish body, "there is no
hope for the younger generation; that it is therefore necessary
to make this group capable of productive activity by being trained to
vocations of agriculture, handicraft, and the like", in order to settle
outside of Germany.
(End note 10: J.C. Hyman to Judge Irving Lehman, 7/14/33 [14 July
1933], R19)
[Kahn predicts: Emigration is
necessary, because the conditions will be worse]
Kahn added that emigration was a necessary part of any future action in
Germany. His own opinion was that the tragedy was of (p.108)
such dimensions that one feared to consider its issue. He was convinced
that the conditions would not improve. "On the contrary, they must
become worse."
(End note 11: Kahn, 4/28/33 [28 April 1933], 14-47)
[JDC fund raising persons in Nazi
Germany]
One of the immediate steps that JDC took was to send its chief fund
raiser, Rabbi Jonah B. Wise, into Germany to try to arrange for a
German counterpart to JDC, which would be capable of receiving funds
from America and distributing them in line with JDC policy. A leader in
this endeavor was Max M. Warburg, Felix M. Warburgs's brother, the head
of the family banking house in Hamburg. Also involved were Karl
Melchior, a high German official and a partner of Warburg in the
Hamburg firm, Dr. Cora Berliner, Ludwig Tietz, a physician and a
well-known public figure, and others.
