Under the circumstances, the
various autonomous organizations affiliated with ZA started a
large-scale program of vocational training directed largely toward
agriculture, gardening, domestic science (for girls), and crafts,
mainly carpentry and metal work.
[3.7.2. Job training programs for emigration]
[Zionist job training programs by
Hechalutz for Palestine]
Part of these courses were organized by Hechalutz, the Zionist
organization training pioneers for Palestine, which increased its
membership from abut 500 prior to Hitler's rise to some 10,000 after he
came to power. In 1933 approximately 2,300 youngsters, just slightly
below half the total, were receiving training (largely agricultural) at
Hechalutz centers; but some of the others made it to Palestine too,
even though their training was not directed specifically toward any
country of immigration.
Table
3
Vocational [Job] Training in Germany [given by Hechalutz centers]
|
Year
|
1933
|
Jan. 1934
|
July 1934
|
Dec. 1934
|
1935
|
1936
|
1938
|
No. of Trainees
|
5,169
|
6,069
|
6,771
|
4,005
|
7,346
|
7,676
|
3,068
|
| (End
note 33: Based on Nathan Reich: Primer, p.98; draft report for
1936-R13; and: Hymans's report to the National Council of JDC, 4/13/35
[13 April 1935]) |
(p.119)
[Non-Zionist job training in
farming in Neuendorf for Avigdor in Argentina since 1931]
A number were directed specifically to South America. For instance, a
farm at Neuendorf had been founded as early as 1931 by non-Zionist
groups such as Jüdische Wanderfürsorge (Care of Jewish Migrants) -
which was later to engage in the repatriation of East Europeans - to
train farmers for the ICA project at Avigdor in Argentina, where many
of the trainees eventually went.
[Non-Zionist job training in
farming in Gross-Breesen since 1936]
In early 1936 RV established another large farm, Gross-Breesen, under
Dr. Kurt Bondy, for 125 trainees. While the Zionists opposed the
principle of its establishment, some Zionists (for example, Dr. Georg
Lubinski) acted as special advisers. Gross-Breesen was a Jewish estate
in Silesia, and after it opened in May 1936 it trained people for
agricultural and carpentry work. The leaders of RV, men like Otto
Hirsch and Julius Seligsohn and other liberal leaders, saw
Gross-Breesen as a ray of hope for liberal Jewry in Germany.
The inspired leadership of a great educator like Bondy gave a measure
of excellence to character training at the farm, besides its real
technical achievements. By the spring of 1938 Gross-Breesen was
actually self-supporting. But emigration plans lagged, and in 1938
plans for group settlement had to be abandoned, despite JDC attempts to
settle the groups in Virginia with the help of a generous Jewish
citizen of Richmond, William B. Thalheimer. (Ultimately, a small
settlement was founded there at Hyde Farmlands, which lasted until
1941).
[Since Nov 1938: Non-Zionist job
training in farming in Holland and England]
After the November 1938 pogrom most of the trainees, including Bondy,
went to Holland and England.
(End note 34: Werner T. Angress: Auswandererlehrgut Gross-Breesen; In:
Leo Baeck Yearbook (1965), 10:168 ff.
[Zionist job training in farming
in Holland and other countries for Palestine since 1918]
The Zionists, on the other hand, concentrated a great deal of their
efforts on taking German Jewish youngsters out of Germany and training
them for Palestine in other European countries, away from the Nazi
atmosphere. There was one such center in existence prior to 1933,
namely, the one at Deventer, Holland, which had been established in
1918. By 1936 there were 1,248 youngsters who were being trained in 26
centers. These also included some that were not exclusively
Palestine-orientated, such as Wieringen in Holland.
Holland took 378 of these young people, Czechoslovakia (p.120)
141, France 124, Denmark 213, Fascist Italy 137, and little Luxembourg
88; the rest were sent to various other countries.
Among the problems that were never solved was the lack of girls and of
professions to train them in.
[The job training in farming]
Most of the training was agricultural, which accounted for over 80 % of
the work done abroad. Hechalutz usually tried to lease farms where the
people could live communally, but sometimes this did not work out, as
in Denmark and Czechoslovakia, and the trainees were forced to live
with individual peasants - which of course limited the possibilities
for cultural and religious activities. There were certain places, as in
Luxembourg, where only the fittest were sent, because work was
especially hard in the vineyards of that country. Nevertheless, the
vast majority withstood these trials, and many of them did go to
Palestine and other countries in the end. In the towns, communal
centers were set up for those who were learning a trade or a craft,
some of them with aid of ORT (as in Lithuania).
(End note 35:
-- David J. Schweitzer at Board of Directors, 1/4/36 [4 January
1936];
-- Training and Retraining outside Germany, 8-1; and:
-- Statement of Reconstructive and Emigration Activities Carried on in
Germany; no date, 14-64)
All this activity, known as Auslands-hachsharah (Foreign Training), was
largely organized by Shalom Adler-Rudel, a Zionist expert in the
training field, and by the German Hechalutz, with some JDC supervision
and financial support. After
[Since 1936: Job training farms
abroad going down because of visa problems]
1936 the Foreign Training program declined, because it became more and
more difficult to place German Jewish youngsters in training abroad.
By 1937 only 774 were in training.
(End note 36: Statistics, R43)
Nevertheless, many hundreds of youngsters had found their emigration
prospects enhanced by participation in these programs.
[3.7.3. Children help programs]
[Since 1932: Programs for children
by Recha Freier]
Connected with problems of training was the larger question of the
future of German Jewish children generally. Owing to the great emphasis
Jewish tradition placed on children and their education, stress was
laid on programs that dealt with solutions for the younger generation.
As early as 1932 Recha Freier, wife of a Berlin rabbi, a wonderful and
immensely strong-willed woman, foresaw the need to save the Jewish
children. She set up an umbrella organization composed of the following
groups: representatives of the Ahavah home, a famous children's
institution in Germany, which was then in the process of moving to
Palestine; representatives (p.121)
of the Palestine children's village, Ben Shemen, which was under the
direction of a great German Jewish teacher, Ernst Lehman; and a unified
body representing all the Zionist youth movements in Germany. On July
14, 1933, the umbrella organization, the Working Body for Children and
Youth Aliyah, submitted a plan to ZA for settling 600 children in
Palestine by 1934, at a cost of 293,300 German marks.
(End note 37: Memo of Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kinder- und Jugendalijah
to ZA, 7/14/33 [14 July 1933], 14-48)
It would accept children between the ages of 13 and 16, who would be
sent to institutions like Ahavah or Ben Shemen or to kibbutzim, or
placed with individual families.
[1933: Copy of Recha Freier's
children's program: Youth Aliyah for Palestine]
The program was adopted, and in Palestine a central organization known
as Youth Aliyah (immigration to Palestine) was set up [in 1933], headed
by the veteran American Zionist Henrietta Szold. After a six-month
training course in Germany, the children, who had been very carefully
screened, were sent to Palestine. It was only in 1936, however, when
630 Youth Aliyah children had reached in Palestine, that the original
1933 goal was finally met. But the adjustment made by the children was
very successful, and the JDC funds were well used through this program
to pay for part of the cost both of training and of transportation.
[1933-1939: JDC founds the German
Jewish Children's Aid for 433 children brought to the "USA"]
From the inner circle of the JDC leadership in America, too, there was
a response to the need to save children. In October 1933 Dr. Solomon
Lowenstein and Jacob Billikopf, head of the National Conference of
Jewish Social Workers, were instrumental in setting up a committee
known as the German Jewish Children's Aid to deal with the transfer of
children from Germany to the United States. It was difficult for the
liberal Jews of America to accept the need for the emigration of German
Jewry, especially that of unaccompanied children. It was doubted that
German Jewish parents would consent to the procedure.
Hyman told Billikopf that it was preferable to send the children to
German-speaking countries on the Continent rather than overseas, and
that it would be even better to keep them in Germany altogether.
(End note 38: Hyman to Billikopf, 1/18/34 [18 January 1934], 14-54)
There were great legal and financial difficulties. A guarantee of $
500 per year for each child had to be given and the placement of
children with families "had encountered a great many difficulties."
Nevertheless, a first group (p.122)
of 53 children arrived in America in November 1934. But Dr. Lowenstein
declared in May 1935 that "the expenditure would seem out of proportion
to the amount actually required for general relief in Germany for
tremendously large numbers of persons and projects. We have, therefore,
regretfully, come to the conclusion that we could not bring over any
other children."
(End note 39:
-- Dr. Lowenstein at Executive Committee, 5/22/35; and:
-- 24 - German Jewish children's aid, 1934-44)
By that time about 150 had been brought here.
After the fall of 1935 the immigration of children became feasible
again, and by early 1937 the committee had filled its original quota of
250 children (actually 235) and continued to accept them at a rate of
10 to 12 a month. The total number of children who came to the United
States under this program until the outbreak of the war in 1939 was 433.
(End note 40: Executive Committee, 4/14/37 [14 April 1937])
[18 children places in England and
Switzerland]
A beginning was also made in children's emigration to England and
Switzerland, where 18 children were placed in 1933 and 1934.
All these efforts made very little difference statistically to the
estimated 101,000 children under 15 who lived in Germany in 1934.
Psychologically, however, parental consent to the emigration of about
1,000 unaccompanied youngsters by 1938 made a significant difference to
the climate of exodus that was swiftly engulfing German Jewry. People
began to be willing, especially after 1935, to send away their most
precious possession - their children - to more hospitable lands.
[3.7.4. JDC schools]
No matter how large the special emigration programs for children might
be, a large majority of them had to remain in Germany. As these
children were slowly forced out of the general school system, the need
arose to give them a Jewish and humanist education in special Jewish
schools. Because of the small funds JDC had at its disposal at the
beginning of what was inappropriately called "the German emergency",
Kahn was at first against founding new institutions, for which large
capital investments would have to be made.
(End note 41: Kahn to Baerwald, 2/23/34 [23 February 1934])
He was in favor of increasing the number of children in the existing
schools by enlarging them, and he vigorously defended the need to
provide funds for Jewish education. The British Jews, mostly Zionists,
argued that no money should be given for schools (p.123)
in Germany, as the children would soon be brought out in any case.
However, reality soon made this discussion academic.
In early 1933 only 6,000 out of some 50,000 Jewish children went to
Jewish schools, but the numbers grew by leaps and bounds each year.
(End note 42: Primer, p. 98; see also 1934 annual report)
This tremendous effort to absorb children who were driven out of
schools by the attitude of classmates and teachers and the general
hate-filled atmosphere
(End note 43: An ordinance against the attendance of Jewish children in
German schools was published on April 1, 1936, but was not rigidly
enforced for quite some time after that).
was made possible by the resolution on the part of the German Jewish
educational and spiritual leadership, men like Leo Baeck, Martin Buber,
Ernst Simon, and others, to build a better spiritual world for Jewry by
returning to Jewish and humanist values and traditions. There probably
were few eras in German Jewish history when there was such a flowering
of Jewish education and thought as in those short years prior to the
catastrophe.
JDC, unlike the British organizations, insisted on aiding and
supporting these activities. Kahn especially was a convinced believer
in the value of spiritual resistance, and he encouraged the German
leaders to use the funds they had for purposes such as these.
[3.7.5. JDC relief work - Jewish welfare recipients]
An area of activity that had to be included in ZA [Central Committee,
Zentral-Ausschuss] work, which JDC strived to avoid as much as possible
in Eastern Europe, was relief. In Germany there was little choice: JDC
understood the need and supported large expenditures for relief. The
number of welfare recipients prior to 1938 usually averaged about 20 %
of the Jewish population. For example, in 1935/6 the number was 83,761;
this increased somewhat in 1937. In addition, funds were
Table
4
Jewish Schools in Germany
|
Year
|
No. of
schools
|
No. of
pupils
|
Total
Jewish children of school age
|
1933
|
70
|
14,300
|
50,000
|
1935
|
130
|
20,000
|
|
1937
|
167
|
23,670
|
39,000
|
(p.124)
given to the Jewish Winter Help, though during the first years of the
German regime some aid was still received from the German government.
(Indeed, the Germanic mind operated so efficiently that until the
outbreak of war, even those Jewish recipients of government pensions
who lived abroad received them punctually).
[Since 1936: Impoverishment of the
Jewish communities - more concentration of the Jews in towns]
However, the continual decline of the Jewish population expressed
itself in the impoverishment of the local communities where most people
in need had been receiving help without recourse to the central
organizations, and in the parallel population movement from small towns
to large urban centers.
In 1937, of the 1,400 or so communities (Gemeinden), 309 were
classified by ZA as being in need and 303 as partly in need; 120 more
asked to be placed in that category. Berlin itself had 15 soup
kitchens, where large numbers of free meals were given out, and about
one-third of the total public Jewish funds in Germany were spent on
welfare in 1935.
(End note 44: Kahn: Report and Bulletin; January 1936, R15; out of the
total amount collected in Germany by all Jewish organizations, Kahn
estimated that 8 million marks were given to "welfare", presumably
child care, medical care, old age care, and relief).
[JDC fund raising for relief work]
German Jewish welfare was efficient and followed modern practice - a
whole generation of Jewish welfare workers had, after all, been trained
in Germany prior to Hitler, although with quite different prospects in
view. JDC reacted to the German situation with great speed. The sum of
$ 40,000 was sent to Germany immediately after Hitler's assumption of
power; and after Jonah B. Wise's trip, $ 254,000 was sent.
(End note 45: Memo on JDC activities in behalf of German Jewry,
10/24/33 [24 October 1933], 14-47)
[May 1933: JDC offices searched -
existence until 1939]
The JDC offices in Berlin were searched by the Nazis in May 1933,
whereupon Hyman spoke to the U.S. State Department, and the American
consul in Berlin intervened "energetically and effectively", as did the
British consul.
(End note 46: Executive Committee, 5/25/33 [25 May 1933])
After that, the JDC office in Berlin was maintained only formally,
under Prof. Eugen Mittwoch, who was responsible for it until 1939.
[3.8. JDC money questions - percentage of the sectors]
[JDC does not want to have dollars
to change in Germany - payments abroad - payments by the German Jews]
Very soon the problem arose of whether to send dollars into Germany. In
1933 and 1934, and to some extent even in 1935, dollars were sent in;
but JDC was looking for a way to prevent foreign currency from accruing
to the Nazi regime through JDC's support of German Jewry. As early as
July 24, 1933, James N. Rosenberg penned a memo to Paul Baerwald and
Felix M. Warburg saying he was against sending dollars to Germany,
(End note 47: 14-47)
and by (p. 125)
the end of the year a way was found to avoid this. In a letter dated
December 16, 1933, Eric Warburg, son of Max M. Warburg, wrote to James
N. Rosenberg that the German Jewish financial expert and friend of the
Warburg house, Hans Schaeffer, had worked out the so-called educational
transfer plan, which had the approval of the German authorities.
(End note 48:
-- 14-46; and:
-- Warburg archives at Cincinnati (hereafter, WAC), Box 316 (d),
interview of James G. McDonald with Dr. Fritz Dreyser, vice-president
of the Reichsbank. It was appparently at this meeting that the final
details were thrashed out and the Germans consented to the
implementation of the scheme).
Under this scheme well-to-do parents would send their children abroad
to study; they would pay for this in German marks at a somewhat higher
rate than usual, the money to be given to ZA [Central Committee,
Zentral-Ausschuss] or RV [Reichsvertretung]. JDC would then pay all the
children's fees and expenses in hard currency abroad. It took some time
until all the needs of ZA could be covered in this way, but generally
speaking no dollars were sent into Germany by JDC after 1935.
ZA's budget was for the central organizations only. The communities had
their own budgets and raised taxes to meet them. ZA's central budget
was met by local collections, contributions by the communities, and the
grants of foreign organizations. But in actual fact, German Jews were
covering the larger part of their needs themselves, and JDC contributed
only to a part of the German Jewish community's effort, namely, to the
budget of ZA.
[The split of the funds]
The money thus received was then spent on the various ZA activities in
different proportions. For example, in 1935 emigration accounted for
some 20 % of the expenditure, whereas in 1936 this rose to about 40 %.
Economic aid and vocational training remained fairly stable at around
25 % of the budget. All the other items - schools, welfare,
organizations, and the like - took less by percentage, but with the
overall increase in the budget this did not mean a reduction in
absolute figures. On the whole, these were the proportions that
prevailed in subsequent years as well.
Some small sums of money allocated by JDC to Germany did not go through
ZA. Late in 1933 the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) offered
their help in dealing with individual cases in Germany, where
operations through recognized German agencies were impossible or
inconvenient. Much of this work was actually only half legal, and the
Quakers did the job very efficiently. The relationship between the two
agencies, based on a common (p. 126)
Table
5
JDC Expenditures in Germany
(In German marks - about 2.5 marks per $)
|
Year
|
JDC
expenditure
|
Total ZA
budget
|
Total
raised in Germany
|
JDC
percentage of ZA budget
|
1934
|
855,427
|
2,418,146
|
13,000,000
|
35.0 %
|
1935
|
933,000
|
2,863,000
|
21,000,000
|
32.5 %
|
1936
|
1,188,884
|
4,123,125
|
|
28.7 %
|
1937
|
1,610,000
|
4,400,000
|
20,000,000
|
36.3 %
|
(End
note 49:
Based on the following main sources:
-- 28-30 - ZA reports for 1935 and 1936
-- 28-3 for the 1937 RV (ZA) budget;
-- R22-ZA report for 1934
-- R19-annual report for 1933;
-- R16-annual report for 1934, and Kahn's report for 1934, 1/3/35 [3
January 1935]
-- R15-Kahn's Bulletin for I.1936;
-- R13-draft of 1936 report, 5/28/37 [28 May 1937]
-- and Baerwald's letter to F.M. Warburg, 3/3/37 [3 March 1937];
-- Executieve Committee meetings of 1/4/34, 3/6/35, 2/10/36, 12/9/37;
-- summary by E.M.M. Morrissey on 3/2/36 in WAC, Box 345 (a).
The figures unfortunately show fairly wide discrepancies, sometimes of
over $ 10,000. The problem of the exchange rates had a great deal to do
with this; we have relied chiefly on summaries made after the close of
each year, for internal purposes, and have disregarded claims made in
public).
|
Footnote:
JDC expenditure: JDC in New York had the following figures
(this included small allocations that did not go through the ZA
budget): 1933: $ 197,000; 1934: $ 440,000; 1935: $ 290,000; 1936: $
546,000; 1937: $ 686,000
(End note 50: Kahn to JDC, September 1938, 9-27)
Footnote: Total raised in Germany: That is, the total sums raised for
public purposes by all Jewish groups, communities, and organizations,
including RV [Reichsvertretung] and ZA [Central Committee,
Zentral-Ausschuss].
Footnote: JDC percentage of ZA budget: Local fund raising brought forth
42.8 % of the funds for the 1935 budget of ZA, 41 % in 1936, and 35.8 %
in 1937. The difference between that and the JDC contribution, on one
hand, and the total required, on the other, was provided largely by ICA
and the Central British Fund for German Jewry (CBF).
|
idea of service without political strings, had been very close ever
since World War I; in the German emergency this relationship prompted
Kahn to say, "I should like to do something for the Quakers, who have
behaved very well, as always."
(End note 51: 22-Gen. & Emerg. Germany, AFSC)
Reports by W.R. Hughes, the Quaker representative in Germany in 1934/5,
gave JDC some insight into the type of work the Quakers did. Apart from
the Quakers, JDC also gave money to other nonsectarian efforts, the
total for the period up to 1936 being $ 116,557.
(End note 52: 29-Gen. & Emerg. Germany, nonsectarian relief)
[3.9. NS poverty methods against the Jews]
[Poverty of emigrated Jews]
The problem of Jews being able to take out enough capital to start a
new life outside of Germany occupied JDC's attention to a large degree.
The Germans had no interest in this, of course, because
[NS Germany: Methods to spread
anti-Semitism and to impoverish the Jews: Rich Jews are taxed]
-- one of their [the German NS regime] aims in pressing for Jewish
emigration was to spread anti-Semitism abroad by dumping poor Jews on
unwilling countries;
-- another aim was to use the money of rich Jews to get rid (p.127)
of the poor ones;
-- and a third [aim] was to squeeze the Jews dry before they were
allowed out of the country.
The fact that all this stood in contradiction to the Nazi aim of
ridding Germany of as many Jews as possible did not bother the Germans.
But whenever it was possible to gain a commercial or political
advantage, or whenever foreign pressure made it a desirable thing to
yield on the question of allowing the emigration of Jewish capital, the
Nazis might relent.
[3.10. Haavarah agreement for emigration to Palestine]
[August 1933: Haavarah agreement
for Jewish capital transfer from NS Germany to Palestine - connected
with exports of German goods]
In August 1933 the Haavarah agreement was arrived at between
Palestinian Jewish interests supported by the Jewish Agency and the
Germans; under this agreement Jews could transfer capital to Palestine
- by promoting German exports to that country. The procedure was as
follows:
a Jewish immigrant deposited his money (usually the equivalent of the
1,000 pounds that entitled him to a "capitalist" immigration
certificate to Palestine) in a German bank; then a German exporter
shipped goods to Palestine for which he was paid with the immigrant's
money; in Palestine the goods were sold to customers who paid the price
to an authorized bank, which in turn paid it out to the immigrant.
The
Jewish Agency justified this arrangement by saying that it was
essential to save Jews and their money, and that importing capital into
Palestine enabled that country to absorb many others who came there
without means. According to one calculation, the total transferred by
Haavarah between 1933 and the end of 1937 amounted to about 4,400,000
pounds.
(End note 53: 15-32)
JDC had no part in this particular transfer scheme, but the program
aroused its interest because it shared the view of the Jewish Agency
that no stone should be left unturned in the effort to bring Jewish
capital out of Germany, and thereby improve the prospects of emigration
for those who had to leave.
In Germany it was mainly Max M. Warburg who displayed great interest in
that sort of plan.
[Money transfer within the
Haavarah agreement]
The Germans at first allowed Jewish men of means to buy free foreign
currency at tremendously inflated prices through a special office
(Golddiskontstelle); then in 1936 another office, the Reichsstelle für
Devisenbeschaffung, allowed the transfers of sums up to 4,000 gold
marks, for which 8,000 (p.128)
marks were paid in Germany - although people actually had to pay in
considerably more than that under various pretenses. In early 1937 a
Jewish bank called Altreu was established to receive these payments,
which then went partly to finance ZA. Whereas the Haavarah bank - the
Paltreu - dealt with transfers to Palestine or to the Middle East only,
Altreu transferred monies to other countries.
Warburg was connected with all these ventures. He was also behind the
establishment, in March 1936, of a bank in London called the
International Trade and Investment Agency (INTRIA), whose managing
director was Siegfried Moses, a German Zionist. This bank placed orders
for German goods in Germany; Altreu then paid for them out of the funds
paid into it by emigrants. the goods were then sold outside Germany,
and the emigrant received his money back in foreign currency from
INTRIA when he arrived in his country of destination. The principle was
the same as with Haavarah, and really amounted to saving Jewish capital
at the price of promoting German exports, albeit with no foreign
currency accruing to the Germans.
(End note 54:
-- 15-3 (10/26/36 [26 October 1936])
-- 25-Gen. & Emerg. Germany, INTRIA, esp. Kahn's letter to Hyman,
8/25/36 [25 August 1936])
[1936: Modification of the money
transfer]
In the summer of 1936 the Germans suggested to JDC a somewhat different
arrangement for the transfer of funds: the emigrants would pay the
German marks into a JDC account in Germany; the Germans would give to
JDC Polish zloty for their marks (Germany had a superabundance of zloty
at the time), and this would finance JDC programs in Poland; JDC would
then pay the emigrant back in foreign currency once he had left
Germany. Kahn's answer was negative, because the Polish program was too
small to satisfy the capital transfer needs of German Jewish emigrants;
in any case, Zionist funds in Poland were used to effect a similar
arrangement between JDC and the Jewish Agency (the Jewish Agency
getting pounds in Palestine from JDC in return for its Polish zloty,
which were used by JDC in Poland). Obviously, the Jewish Agency
arrangement was preferred.
(End note 55: Ibid.)
[Money transfer by "benevolent"
marks]
By 1937 another plan for the transfer of funds was arranged - the
"benevolent" marks. A benefactor outside Germany who (p.129)
wished to help an individual in Germany would pay a sum of money into a
bank in his own country. The bank would transfer the money to INTRIA.
The equivalent of that sum in marks would then be paid by Altreu to the
recipient in Germany out of funds deposited by an emigrant. When that
emigrant left Germany, the money would be repaid to him by INTRIA.
There was no export involved in this kind of transaction, and JDC,
which was of two minds about the various export arrangements, had no
hesitation in supporting this scheme. It was estimated that in 1937
some $ 400,000 was transferred to Germany in this way.
(End note 56: Ibid.)
The Germans, for reasons of their own, liberalized these arrangements
in late 1937 and early 1938; people could pay up to 50,000 marks to
Altreu, and sometimes received up to 50 % of this sum in foreign
currency. RV [Reichsvertretung] received a certain percentage of these
monies for its operations. However, on the whole JDC tried to avoid any
direct connection with these banks and agencies, children of Max M.
Warburg's resourceful brain - many Jews were opposed to any kind of
transaction with Nazi Germany, and JDC was intent on remaining as
independent as possible, and not exposing itself to attack by any side.
[At the end Palestine was in danger to be occupied by NS armies, but
Rommel's army could be stopped before entering Egypt].
[3.11. Joint's reconstruction work in NS Germany since
1933]
Reconstruction was, of course, another sphere of activity which JDC
took a very special interest. Much was said about the need for
reconstruction in the German situation, though the emphasis on this
decreased as the Nazi intent to evict the Jews became obvious. In the
early 1930s, however, this was not quite so clear,
Table
6
Loan Kassas of the Reconstruction Foundation in Germany
|
Year
|
No. of
kassas
|
Capital
(in marks)
|
No. of
loans
|
Amount
loaned (in marks)
|
1933
|
42
|
934,000
|
1417
|
465,000
|
1935
|
60
|
848,000
|
|
880,000
|
1937
|
45
|
|
3500
|
1,070,000
|
(p.130)
and JDC tried, through the Reconstruction Foundation, to create loan
kassas in Germany on the well-tried
East European model.
After 1937 a swift decline set in as the German government made the
kassas operations practically impossible, and at the end of 1938 they
were terminated.
JDC also tried to create Free Loan kassas outside the Reconstruction
Foundation system, as in Poland, and invested over 400,000 marks in
them between 1933 and 1937. But before they could take root, the Nazis
made their operations impossible too, and they were liquidated along
with the rest of the
kassas
in December 1938.
(End note 57:
-- Printer, p. 97;
-- 24-Gen. & Emerg. Germany, Foundation, 1933-39
-- 26-Gen & Emerg. Germany, Lists, etc. 1935/6
-- 28-30-ZA report, 1936)
[1934: Less anti-Semitism in NS
Germany - discussions about the Jewish future 1935]
The situation in Germany itself fluctuated from year to year. It cannot
even be said that there was always a distinct trend for the worse. For
instance, in 1934 - the year of the great purge in the Nazi party (June
30) - it seemed that the anti-Semitic wave had abated slightly, and
there was no new wave of terror or boycott directed against the Jews.
"Superficially regarded", said Kahn, "it would appear that a certain
halt has been called in Germany to the measures adopted against the
Jewish population."
(End note 58: Kahn report, 3/28/34 [28 March 1934]; In: WAC, Box 321
(b)
Hitler himself had reportedly said as much at a meeting with the German
Statthälter (state
governors). In other words, there was still room for a certain measure
of self-delusion.
Against that background a great controversy between the nationalist and
liberal wings of Jewry continued in Germany. Zionists demanded the
recognition of Jewish separateness on the basis of Jewish national
identification. The liberal CV rejected this point of view with
"determined unanimity", because they saw in Germany the center of their
endeavors "now, just as in the past".
(End note 59: CV-Blaetter für Deutschtum und Judentum, 1/10/35 [10
January 1935], by Dr. Emil Herzfeld. (Fate played a trick on Dr.
Herzfeld: ultimately he had to settle in Palestine, where he lived out
his days in national Jewish Tel Aviv). The declaration in support of
Hitler's foreign policy was made in November 1933; see: Grunewald, op.
cit. [The Beginning of the Reichsvertretung; In: Leo Baeck Yearbook;
London 1956], pp., 57 ff.)
The liberal Jews of Germany obviously thought that they would outlast
the Hitler regime, and in 1934 and early 1935 it was still possible to
believe that. In early 1935 Dr. Jonah B. Wise, one of the leaders of
JDC, who had just come back from Europe, agreed with this position
mainly from a pragmatic point of view. The question was "to meet the
onslaught of Hitler and survive it. They (the German Jews) feel they
have possibilities of surviving for some years. If conditions do not
radically change, many affluent persons will (p.131)
remain in Germany. Most of them will remain because there is no place
for them to go and no country wants people over forty unless they have
the highest specialization for some work." However, Wise added a remark
that reflected a growing conviction among German Jews in the spring of
1935: "That the young people will leave is almost certain. It is said
that Germany will be an old folds' home and a graveyard."
(End note 60: Executive Committee, 3/26/35 [26 March 1935]; Hyman
said in his contribution to a summary for 1934 (R53): "The hope of
Jewish leaders to find an orderly, constructive transformation of a
segment of Jewish life, especially for the yough, within the borders of
Germany itself, to be supplemented by a carefully nurtured preparation
of waves of annual emigration, has been disappointed, since training is
permitted only for emigration, immediate or ultimate." B.C. Vladeck, a
Labor member of the JDC Executive Committee, put a socialist
interpretation on the same ideas when, in a discussion with the Zionist
Berl Locker (12/23/35-WAC, Box 323 (d), he said that "there is a vast
underground movement in Germany of 'Aryans', socialists, etc., who are
fighting the Fascist regime and that the Jew must fight along with
them." Therefore, the task of progressive Jews in Germany was to stay
where they were).
[End 1933: RV supports Hitler's
foreign policy]
RV [Reichsvertretung] was largely under the control of liberals like
Hirsch, Seligsohn, and Brodnitz. At the end of 1933 it came out with a
declaration supporting Hitler's foreign policy; this was done not
because of Nazi pressure but because of the German-centered convictions
of its leading members.
[Jan 1935: Jewish Saar Germans
included]
In January 1935 it "heartily welcomed home" the 4,800 "Jewish Saar
Germans" after the Saar plebiscite had resulted in the annexation of
that area by Germany. (Saarlander Jews even came from abroad to vote
for the inclusion of the region in Germany!)
(End note 61: Jewish Chronicle, 1/13/35 [13 January 1935]. On the
18, the Chronicle reported that a man named Herr Fischel had come all
the way from Buenos Aires, his fare paid by the German consulate, to
vote for Germany).
[Naumann's National German Jews
section]
There was an even more extremist Germanic section of Jewry, led by Dr.
Max Naumann, whose organization tried to create a category called the
National German Jews (Nationaldeutsche Juden). "We would regard it as a
national calamity for Germany and for us National Jews, who are among
the best Germans, if Hitler did not take the fate of the German people
in his hands. The members of our league, more than 5,000 people, voted
as one man for Hitler as Reich president. Hitler is our future. No one
but he can solve the Jewish question."
(End note 62: Ibid., 1/11/35 [11 January 1935]. Interview of
La Croix with Naumann)
This, of course, was the opinion of but a small lunatic fringe, but it
is significant that these opinions should have been stated as late as
the end of 1934 and early 1935.
RV [Reichsvertretung], however, was far from a supine servant of the
Nazi dictatorship.
[Jewish press in NS Germany: RV
fighting the regime: Streicher's Stürmer (Stormer)]
Throughout 1935 Baeck and Hirsch and their friends tried to fight back,
supported by the foreign organizations, and took their case to the
still-legal Jewish press in Germany. For instance, on February 8, 1935,
the
CV-Zeitung published a
frontal attack by Rabbi Eschelbacher on
Der Stürmer, Julius Streicher's
obscenely anti-Semitic paper.
(End note 63: P. 11, in an article called: Eine Nummer des Stuermer)
In the same issue there was a direct attack against Streicher himself,
for "accusing" an opposition leader - (p.132)
wrongly - of being Jewish. One argument used by RV [Reichsvertretung]
was that since the Nazi rule was totalitarian, the Nazis could have
done more against the Jews than they actually did. Since "only" certain
restrictions were in force, the conclusion was that German Jewry had
the right to fight back on the basis of the actual laws on the books,
that they could prevent a worsening of the situation by appealing to
the law.
(End note 64: CV-Zeitung, 1/31/35 [31 January 1935])
[Jewish press in NS Germany:
Public protest against Streicher]
In the January 31, 1935, issue there was even a public protest by RV,
signed by Baeck and Hirsch, against Streicher. Entitled "The Honor of
German Jews", it culminated in the statement that "for the guarding of
our honor nothing remains to us but a solemn public protest."
(End note 65: Ibid. [CV-Zeitung, 1/31/35 [31 January 1935]: "Zur
Wahrung unserer Ehre bleibt uns nichts als feierlicher Protest.")
A possibility of appealing to the courts under the laws of libel was
hinted at.
[Jewish press in NS Germany:
Attack against Nazi minister Schemm]
This point was made in even more explicit terms on February 14, when a
direct attack was printed on the Nazi minister Schemm, the "leader" of
the Nazi Teacher's Association, who had abused the Jewish religion.
Schemm was told that he had thereby maligned the Christian God and had
"harshly insulted, not only the religious feelings of German Jews, but
those of Jews all over the world as well."
(End note 66: Ibid. [CV-Zeitung], 2/14/35 [14 February 1935], p.11)
[Jewish press in NS Germany:
Rundschau demands]
The Zionist
Jüdische Rundschau
published an article demanding that the government cease to defame
Jews, that it guarantee decent material conditions under prevailing
legislation, and that it establish orderly emigration procedures and
autonomous cultural institutions.
(End note 67: Quoted in
Jewish
Chronicle, 3/15/35 [15 March 1935])
It must be remembered that this took place in Nazi Germany almost two
years after the abolition of all parties and the independent press. The
courage displayed by RV was wholly admirable, but of course no results
were achieved.
[3.12. The race laws of 1935 - Zionist Jewry splits]
[Four RV demands for accepting the
race laws]
All these attempts at maintaining a foothold in Germany collapsed with
the publication of the Nuremberg racial laws on September 15, and the
first of twelve detailed provisions (Verordnungen) on November 14,
1935. Immediately following the publication, RV came out with a
four-point program demanding that, on the basis of the new laws, the
government stop the defamation and the boycott, grant cultural and
religious autonomy to the Jews, and recognize RV as the central Jewish
organization. Under these conditions, the Jews would accept the new
laws.
(End note 68:
Informationsblätter
der RV, 9/22/35 [22 September 1935])
[The Zionists in discussion about
the race laws]
This stand produced a bitter argument between the Zionists, (p.133)
who demanded nonrecognition of the Nuremberg laws, and the RV
leadership. The Zionists had been in the peculiar position of opposing
the Nazis more vigorously than the liberals and yet being supported, in
a way, by the government because of their advocacy of emigration to
Palestine. The Nazis argued that Zionists helped Germany solve the
Jewish problem and that Palestine could absorb a million Jews. If only
half of these were German Jews, then the whole Jewish problem might be
solved.
(End note 69:
Jewish Chronicle,
5/17/35 [17 May 1935], quoting
Der
Völkische Beobachter)
This did not mean, of course, that the Nazis did not attack the
Zionists as well; Goebbels's [newspaper]
Angriff did so frequently.
[Zionist want the national
definition of Jews - Kareski (Jewish Volkspartei) defends the race laws
- more Zionists in the RV (Reichsvertretung) - blame of Kareski -
suspicion collaboration with Gestapo]
Inside the Jewish community, the Zionists pressed for a policy of
national definition and speedy emigration, and demanded a greater say
in the affairs of RV. A spokesman of the Zionist Right in the Berlin
community (the so-called Jewish Volkspartei), Georg Kareski, took a
different position in an interview published in the [newspaper]
Angriff (quoted in the Jewish
Chronicle, January 3, 1936), where he defended the new laws as offering
an answer to the problem of an alien nationality, provided they were
executed on a basis of mutual respect.
The Zionists now turned against Kareski as well, and he was practically
ostracized at a conference held at Berlin in early February 1936.
However, during the following year Kareski tried repeatedly to oppose a
reconstructed RV, in which the Zionists now had a greater say.
This situation came to a head in the spring of 1937 when the leaders of
RV appealed to the foreign organizations to prevent the takeover of RV
by Kareski, who, they insinuated, was cooperating with the Gestapo.
After consultation between JDC and the British Jews, on June 11, 1937,
a letter was written over the signature of Sir Herbert Samuel to Leo
Baeck, in which confidence was reiterated in "the present personnel and
management" of RV. Serious misgivings were expressed in the event of
any change in the composition of RV.
(End note 70: Executive Committee, 9/23/37 [23 September 1937])
It is not clear whether it was this intervention that changed the
situation, but it is probable that it had at least some influence. At
any rate, RV maintained its independence of internal Gestapo pressure
for some time longer, and Kareski's attempt was repulsed. (p.134)
[3.13. Competition in fund raising between JDC and
Zionists - 174,803 emigrants 1933-1937]
The problem of Zionism exercised JDC, too, to a considerable extent,
though from a different angle. In the United States the Palestine
appeals were the direct competitors of JDC in its fund raising efforts.
From a practical as well as an ideological point of view, JDC
emphasized that Palestine, whatever its undoubted contribution to the
solution of the German Jewish problem, could not be the only solution.
Hyman, a man inclined to search for the deeper meaning of things and
processes, termed Zionism in this context a millennial movement. He
scoffed at the idea that nothing should be done until a millennium was
reached by the aid of one program or another, because indeed "all other
things are merely palliative."
(End note 71: Hyman to Janowsky, 11/24/37 [24 November 1937], R13)
The Zionists thought in terms of a national future and an overall
solution, whereas JDC tended to see the immediate practical problems
involved in helping persecuted Jews. The Zionists therefore were
inclined to minimize avenues of rescue other than Palestine, at least
until 1937/8, and often would not seriously consider the possibilities
of rescuing Jews by sending them to other countries; while JDC did not
see beyond the immediate present and could not tear itself from its
cosmopolitan concepts, which perhaps had been valid in the liberal
pre-Hitler era but had little validity in the growing catastrophe of
European Jewry.
Even practically speaking, from 1933 through 1937, 38,043 out of
174,803 emigrants from Germany had found refuge in Palestine.
This is even more significant when one remembers that those who entered
Palestine were settled and absorbed there, whereas the majority of
those who remained in Europe were neither settled nor absorbed.
Hyman was very much concerned about the pro-Palestine statements that
many of the liberal Jewish leaders in Germany made to the effect that
"everything is hopeless in Germany; ... practically all want to go to
Palestine." The logical conclusion from this attitude, he said, was
that Palestine work and the Palestine program were the only kind of
program that the American Jews should support. This was most
unfortunate, Hyman stated; surely JDC was entitled to be reinforced by
the Jewish leaders in Germany with a plea for aid and support of the
institutions that must be maintained inside Germany. This despite the
"full acknowledgment (p.136)
of what Palestine has meant to these Jews of Germany."
Hyman thought that a statement should be made by the German Jews that
Palestine was not the sole outlet - which of course, factually
speaking, it was not.
(End note 72:
-- The statistics are taken from an article by Max Birnbaum in the
Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt für die Synagogengemeinden in Preussen und
Norddeutschland, 4/4/1938 [4 April 1938].
-- Hyman to Kahn, 10/11/35 [11 October 1935], CON. 2;
-- Hyman explained his position in an article published in the 1937
Proceedings of the National
Conference of Jewish Social Welfare in the
Jewish Social Service Quarterly
(R12). Non-Zionists, he said, see nothing wrong in supporting Communism
if this would help millions of Jews to find their feet in a new Russian
economy; at the same timje they can support "the building up of a great
Jewish settlement of refuge and of cultural development in Palestine
and yet decline to regard themselves as actually or potentially
elements of a Jewish nation with its center in Palestine." While
Palestine was capable of absorbing masses of immigrants, they do
"deprecate the constant emphasis on Palestine by certain groups", as a
Jewish national movement. The major goal of non-Zionists was "the
integration of Jews with the life of their lands of birth or adoption.")
[Hitler regime supports Zionism
for emigration to Palestine]
Kahn agreed, but explained that the Nazis supported Zionism because it
promised the largest emigration of Jews from Germany; hence German
Jewish leaders could not make any public statement about other outlets.
Still less could they mention the desire to maintain Jewish
institutions in Germany. The Nazis had dissolved one meeting in Germany
simply because the speaker had said, "We have to provide for the people
who go away and for the Jews who must stay in Germany."
(End note 73: Kahn to Hyman, 11/3/35 [3 November 1935], CON 2)
[but at the end Palestine is projected to be occupied by NS armies].
The sharp reduction of emigration into Palestine in 1936 - only 12,929
emigrated there from Germany that year - somewhat changed the Zionist
policy. Weizmann, for his part, had never taken a completely exclusive
point of view, and many individual Zionists shared his stand: now, the
Zionists began to cooperate in the search for outlets other than
Palestine. Despite the insistence of Zionists on Palestine for national
and historic reasons, the difference between them and the other became
smaller. JDC abandoned its doubts about supporting emigration and began
to see that maintaining institutions in Germany was only a holding
operation. The Zionists outside of Germany in turn began to perceive
the importance of maintaining those institutions as long as there were
Jews in Germany who needed them. The two main wings in Jewish life drew
slowly closer on purely practical grounds as the 1930s progressed and
the situation in Germany became more and more difficult.
[3.14. Situation after the Nuremberg laws after 1935 -
destruction of German Jewry since 1937]
After the Nuremberg laws were promulgated, the economic situation of
German Jewry deteriorated swiftly. Kahn reported in November 1935 that
Jewish businesses were being sold at ridiculously low prices and that
Jewish unemployment had risen. Of 150,000 self-employed persons, 37,000
were now unemployed, including 20,000 who were on relief. Of the
120,000 employees and workers, 48,000 were unemployed, and of these
32,000 were on (p.136)
relief. In 1936 41 soup kitchens distributed 2,357,000 meals, and 3,000
places in old age homes were reserved for people whose families could
no longer take care of them: the numbers were increasing.
(End note 74: 28-30-ZA report 1938)
Jonah B. Wise's forecast, made a year previously, that Germany would
become an old age home and a graveyard to its Jews, was obviously in
the process of realization.
[Jan 1937: Jewish work offices
closed - work prohibition for Jews on any higher profession - World War
I privilege revoked]
After early January 1937 all Jewish labor exchanges were closed, and
the Arbeitsfront pressed for the discharge of Jewish employees in
non-Jewish stores. A short respite was granted to German Jewry because
of the 1936 Olympic Games, which took place in Germany, but persecution
never really stopped. Jews were eliminated from newspaper staffs and
from the arts, and they ceased to function as public notaries,
apothecaries, veterinarians, and similar professions. The exemptions
that had been granted earlier for frontline soldiers in World War I
were now revoked.
[March 1937 appr.: Destruction of
Jewry in Germany is going on]
In early 1937 there were no longer any illusions anywhere. JDC, which
had moved from a position of qualified support for emigration to one of
unqualified support, was quite certain that "the German problem is
bound to solve itself before long. Certainly, it will not solve itself
in an agreeable way. ... More people will leave in much larger numbers
than statistics show; a great many have left and are here and elsewhere
on visitor's passes and will never go back."
(End note 75: Felix M. Warburg at a meeting at the home of Ittleson,
4/29/37 [29 April 1937], R13)
[March 1938 appr.: 380,000 Jews in
Germany left]
By early 1938 only 380,000 Jews were left in Germany. Of these, 82,000
were receiving winter relief and an additional 20,000 were getting
special Jewish relief.
(End note 76: Executive Committee, 1/20/38 [20 January 1938]; Kahn on
Germany, WYC, Box 327 (c), November 1935)
German Jewry was approaching its end.
[There is no indication if the 1/4, 1/2 and 3/4 Jews are counted within
the figures or not].
