[A.
Destruction of the Jewish existence in Poland
1929-1939]
[5.8. Claims abroad of anti-Semitic Poland for emigration
of
Polish Jewry]
[1938: Conference of Evian: claims
of anti-Semitic Poland for emigration of Polish Jewry]
When President Roosevelt called upon the nations of the world to meet
in Evian in July 1938 to discuss the problem of refugees from Germany,
the Polish government also swung into action and demanded that the
Evian Conference discuss the problem of Jewish emigration from Poland.
The Americans and British refused, but the Poles tried to press the
Jews themselves to ask for the inclusion of the Polish Jewish problem
at Evian. In the course of this campaign the Polish ambassador in
Washington, Count Potocki, approached the American Jewish Committee and
JDC (on June 8, 1938). He asked for an emigration of 50,000 a year, and
alleged that the relatively small emigration of 30,000 in 1935 had had
a psychologically calming effect on Polish anti-Semitism.
(End note 49: Conversation between Potocki, Waldman, and Hyman, 6/8/38
[8 June 1938], CON-2)
(Actually, after the "calming effect" of the 1935 emigration, pogrom
activity increased sharply in late 1935 and in 1936. Nevertheless, the
argument that emigration would be an effective way of avoiding
anti-Semitic outbursts became a deeply ingrained belief among Jewish
leaders in Poland).
[1937: New York: Polish consul
Gruszka states that Jewish emigration would help democracy...]
In a more subtle way the same point was made in discussions held in New
York in October 1937 between the Polish consul general, Sylvester
Gruszka, and JDC. Gruszka also demanded emigration. He intimated that
-- this would aid the democratic and liberal wing in the Polish
government in their struggle against Polish reaction,
-- and that therefore the support of American Jewry for Poland was very
important.
-- He asked specifically that the New York Times be persuaded to desist
from anti-Polish articles,
-- that the influx of American Jewish capital into Poland be organized,
-- and that JDC help in eliminating from the public scene in Poland
those American Jewish organizations that the Poles considered
objectionable.
[The main problem, the economy, will not be solved by this].
[American Federation of Polish
Jews (AFPJ): Campaigns against anti-Semitism - Gruszka wants to play
the Jewish organizations off against each other]
This last referred to the American Federation of (p.194)
Polish Jews, which was conducting a propaganda campaign with largely
political overtones against anti-Semitism. There was considerable
Zionist influence on AFPJ, and it was even trying to collect money for
Polish causes in the U.S., which in the eyes of JDC was wrong. When
Gruszka tried to use the animosity between the two Jewish organizations
in order to put them against each other, however, Hyman refused to
cooperate.
The AFPJ, he told Gruszka, was quite useful, if only they would stop
competitive fund raising. He and Kahn "stated very definitely that we
could not assent to the idea of permitting any pressure to be brought
upon the Jews of Poland in relation to the Federation."
(End note 50: Conversation between Gruszka, Kahn, and Hyman, 10/17/37
[17 October 1937], CON-2)
[Gruszka: JDC is the main
development aid for Poland]
At the same time, Gruszka intimated that JDC was after all the source
of most of the money sent to Poland, and its cooperation was needed for
any development connected with the modernization of Polish industry,
the advancement of Polish exports to the U.S., and the emigration of
Jews.
[The chameleon of the Polish
policy
abroad (facade) and at home (reality)]
In planning its policy in Poland, JDC had to take into account the
difference between the utterances of Polish representatives abroad and
the actual policy of the Polish government vis-à-vis the Jews. Abroad,
the pressure for Jewish emigration was coupled both with plans for the
modernization of the Polish economy and with statements expressing the
hope that the Jews who would remain in Poland would be assimilated
politically and become patriotic Poles.
[Anti-Semitic Poland: JDC Giterman
reports fair treatment of the Jews would result in voting out of
politicians]
The Jews in Poland were loyal to Poland (if for no other reason than
that the alternatives in the 1930s were Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia),
but in actual practice the Polish government did not tend to act on
such optimistic and relatively friendly premises. The head of the JDC
office in Poland, Isaac Giterman, declared quite bluntly - on the basis
of very full knowledge of Polish policy toward Jews - that there simply
was no possibility of a more liberal treatment of the Jews. Polish
anti-Semitism was inherent in the local population, and any minister
who treated the Jews fairly would lose his position.
(End note 51: 44-6-Neville Laski report, August 1934)
