[A.
Destruction of the Jewish existence in Poland
1929-1939]
[5.9. JDC work in anti-Semitic Poland: Kassas - Jewish
starvation]
[1930s: Anti-Semitic Poland: JDC
gives no support to Polish Jews - help only in special cases like
floods or after pogroms]
In the face of these obstacles and difficulties, the policy of JDC was
intractable and heartrending. In the 1930s JDC
continued to (p.195)
refuse to spend its monies
on relief.
[There is the suspicion that also JDC was in line with the Zionists to
exterminate the Yiddish speaking Jews].
But that policy could not always be maintained. There were natural
disasters, such as the floods in Galicia in the summer of 1934, which
caused damage estimated at 1 million zloty ($ 200,000). The Polish
government established a "nonsectarian" relief committee (with one
Jewish representative) and JDC contributed $ 10,000, or 5 % of the sum
that was needed.
Then there were man-made disasters. After each pogrom, JDC stepped in
to save whatever could be saved. Its Free Loan
kassas were strengthened in
localities hit by the outrages, and the child care, health, and
educational institutions supported by JDC increased their allocations
to help as best they could.
Some of the items that appeared in JDC budgets as constructive help
through the support of organizations were in fact little more than
intelligently - indeed, constructively - applied relief to stricken
communities.
[JDC industrialization plans for
Poland]
Generally speaking, however, in its approach to the Polish Jewish
problem JDC moved more and more in the direction of the
industrialization plans advanced by Kahn. The sums devoted to Poland
were increasing, and there seemed to be an opportunity for testing
Kahn's plans.
[The industrialization which Stalin performs in Soviet Union in the
1930s is performed in Poland only since 1950].
[JDC kassas are partly not
operating!]
The problem of the industrialization plans was intimately connected
with the future of the Free Loan and Reconstruction Foundation loan
kassas. The older, more
conservative loan
kassas were
able to help those who were in a stronger economic position by loans
with a low rate of interest. We have also seen that the position of
these
kassas weakened as a
result of the 1929 economic crisis.
On paper there were still 680 such institutions in Poland in 1933, but
an indeterminate number of these were in fact inactive. In 1934 it was
estimated that only 340 of the 601 still registered were actually
operating. The figures quoted in various JDC sources were
contradictory; but by 1935 only 223 kassas were said to be in
operation, and 221 more were inactive.
[1935-1937: Anti-Semitic Poland:
Reconstruction Foundation for reorganizing the JDC kassas]
The Reconstruction Foundation stepped in, and throughout 1935-37 tried
hard to reorganize the
kassas.
Their importance lay, after all, in the fact that large numbers of
small traders, artisans, (p.196)
and small manufacturers, as well as members of the intelligentsia, had
recourse to them. Even in early 1936 the number of active members was
estimated to be over 47,000. There was an umbrella organization of
these kassas, largely influenced by Zionist elements. This group, the
Verband, had no financial responsibilities, but was supposed to
supervise the kassas and to see to it that the rules and regulations
were observed. It was not at all efficient.
In the autumn of 1936 Kahn and ICA [Jewish Colonization Association]
intervened decisively and declared
that they would maintain direct contact with the kassas and no longer
work through the Verband.
[May 1937: Anti-Semitic Poland:
Reconstruction Foundation sets up Central Financial Institution under
Karol Sachs]
Despite the negative experience with the Central Bank in the early
1930s, the Reconstruction Foundation set up a new Central Financial
Institution, headed by its own nominees from the conservative and
largely assimilated group around the Jewish industrialist Karol Sachs.
Sachs received the highest accolade JDC could bestow on a Polish Jew:
he was placed "in the class of our own leaders in America".
(End note 52: r10, Troper report, 2/17/39 [17 February 1939])
The institution was set up in May 1937, and from then on the
Reconstruction Foundation gave its credits to the
kassas through it, leaving the
Verband to deal with questions of organization and rules. In 1937 the
foundation appropriated 1 million zloty ($ 200,000) to reorganize and
revitalize
kassas, under the
prodding of its very effective deputy director, Noel Aronovici.
[1932-1937: Kassa work without
industrialization]
At the same time, the foundation [Reconstruction Foundation] was
pursuing an essentially conservative policy. Between 1932 and 1935,
during and after the dissolution of the Central Bank, the foundation
actually withdrew more monies from the
kassas than it gave them in
credits.
(End note 53: Between 1932 and 1934, 745,000 zloty were granted in
credits and 2,394,000 zloty received in repayment (46-reports 36/7,
memorandum of 9/30/37 [30 September 1937])
This money was not returned to the foundation, but kept in Poland. It
was not reinvested, however, until the new Central Financial
Institution had been set up in 1937/8. In 1937 the foundation books
showed a reserve of $ 494,000 in cash, and its total expenditure in
credits granted that year was considerably less than that. ICA had no
real wish to invest the monies in doubtful industrialization plans in
Poland, and so the kassas carried on with their work of helping those
whose economic situation was
sound.
At the end of 1937, 241 (p.197)
kassas were functioning
and 161 more were awaiting reorganization; 205 others were defunct and
had to be liquidated.
[Supplement: There comes up a severe and logic suspicion:
Industrialization in Poland should be realized only without the Yiddish
Jews. The anti-Semitic Polish government did not want that the Jews
would integrate by industrialization as the integrated in the Soviet
Union. So the Yiddish Jews should first be exterminated before
industrialization comes in Poland in the 1950s].
At the same time, the Reconstruction Foundation included in its work
program loan kassas organized by merchants on an occupational rather
than general basis. The functioning kassas included 37 such merchants'
institutions, which were really small merchants' banks; these were
quite successful. Kassa membership in Poland at the end of 1937
numbered some 68,000.
[Loan kassas of the Reconstruction
Foundation help reinstall Jewish business from inner Polish Jewish
refugees in the towns]
As we have already seen, the political situation of Polish Jewry began
to improve very slightly in early 1939. However, the economic situation
was worsening, and the loan
kassas
had do intervene in what really amounted to a prevention of catastrophe
rather than reconstruction. While most of the work in this respect was
done by the Free Loan
kassas,
the loan
kassas of the
Reconstruction Foundation also played a part. A report in 1939 claimed
that in many places the
kassas
had prevented the elimination of Jewish market stalls and bakeries;
Jews who had been forced to leave their villages by the pogroms of
1937/8 were now being helped to establish places of business in towns.
Certain projects engaged in by the more successful artisans and
traders, such as fowl fattening, sawmills, and production of soda, were
also being aided by the kassas.
(End note 54: R60, report of 4/18/39 [18 April 1939])
[Reconstructions Foundation is too
strict - many kassas are ruined by the foundation itself]
Relations between the
kassas
and the Reconstruction Foundation were not always happy. The foundation
did supply credits, but only on strict terms. On the harsh conditions
of economic crisis in Poland there were occasionally bitter
recriminations at the rigid way in which agreements were interpreted.
The complaint was even heard that the foundation credits had been
collected "harshly and ruthlessly, and many kassas have been ruined" by
the foundation itself.
(End note 55: Raphael Szereszewsky, quoted in a report of the
Reconstruction Foundation, 5/22/36 [22 May 1936], WAC, Box 347 (d)
[Supplement: That's the sense: The Yiddish Jews should not be helped...]
Against this stood the foundation policy, which was quite clearly "not
to save the weak and unsound, but to fortify and strengthen the sound
and secure positions."
(End note 56: 44-21, Alexander Kahn report, 12/9/37 [9 December 1937])
[Popular Free Loan kassas]
The main instrument of reconstructive work in Poland was not, however,
the loan
kassa but the Free
Loan
kassa. These
institutions, it will be remembered, were JDC creations and had no
(p.198)
contact with the Reconstruction Foundation-run enterprises. They became
immensely popular as the economic crisis hardened, because they charged
almost no interest on loans. There were 676 such
kassas in Poland in 1933, and 841
by 1939. This meant that in practically every Jewish village there was
a
kassa where impoverished
artisans and traders and intellectuals, and to a certain extent
workers, could get loans to tide them over difficult times. These loans
were very small, averaging about $16. But they often prevented a Jew
from becoming a public charge.
[CEKABE gives credits to the
kassas]
The central institution of the
kassas
was the CEKABE,
(End note 57: Polish initials for the Central Society for Free Credit
and Furthering of Productive Work among the Jewish Population in Poland)
through which credits were channeled to the
kassas; it also filled the
functions exercised by the Verband in regard to the foundation loan
kassas.
[Kassa figures]
The total amounts loaned by the Free Loan
kassas were at first considerably
below those loaned by the foundation
kassas
- in 1934 the latter loaned $ 38.8 million, whereas the Free Loan
kassas only loaned $ 2.2 million -
but the number of free loan grew steadily throughout the 1930s. The
average sums loaned were paltry, which in itself was an indication of
the deteriorating position of the Jews.
While the number of free loans and their general totals were
increasing, the Reconstruction Foundation
kassas' work was declining: in
1936, the foundation kassas had loaned $ 15.8 million, or 40 % of the
1934 total.
Table
13: Free Loan Kassas in Poland
|
Year
|
No. of
loans
|
Total
amount (in millions of zloty)
|
Average
loans (in zloty)
|
[conversion
in $]
|
1933
|
135,600
|
10.7
|
79
|
($16)
|
1934
|
125,000
|
11.0
|
88
|
($
17.60)
|
1935
|
149,214
|
14.5
|
97
|
($
19.40)
|
1936
|
163,670
|
15.0
|
92
|
($
18.40)
|
1937
|
191,294
|
18.0
|
94
|
($
18.80)
|
1938
|
221,226
|
20.0
|
90
|
($
18)
|
(End
note 58: The figures are rather problematic. There are divergences in
the reports and between one report and another. It must be remembered
that there were self-help institutions approximating the JDC-supported
kassas in almost every locality, and many of these were not recognized
by CEKABE. Reports from the localities were not always accurate).
|
(p.199)
With the relative increase in funds available for Poland, Kahn returned
to the idea of industrial and other constructive investments in
strategic places. In May 1935 he asked for a special yearly allocation
of $ 100,000 for that purpose. The idea was received favorably by
Bearwald, who advanced the project in a memorandum of September of that
year.
(End note 59:
-- Kahn to Warburg, 5/11/35 [11 May 1935], 15-33;
-- and 44-5, Baerwald memo, 9/18/35 [18 September 1935])
British help was solicited, and the Board of Deputies agreed to
participate in the effort.
As early as April 1934 a Jewish Economic Council (known as
Wirtschaftsrat) had been founded by CEKABE; it was run by Isaac
Giterman. This now swung into action and in 1936 started very
cautiously to help in establishing small local crafts and industries,
and to supervise them, check the quality of the products, and aid in
finding appropriate markets if necessary. This kind of rather plodding
but quite effective small-scale work went on throughout 1937 and
1938.
[1938: Subcommittee TER for
finding export markets - financed by JDC and others]
A special subcommittee set up by the Wirtschaftsrat in January 1938,
called TER, took over the task of finding export markets for those
establishments that needed it. In this, it was hoped, some government
help would be obtained. A total of about $ 410,000 was invested in
these ventures directly by JDC; an additional 30-40 % was found
locally.
[JDC organizes help for families
and artisans by fund raising at the Landsmannschaften in "America"]
In addition, the call went out to certain expatriate organizations in
America, comprised of people who had emigrated from certain localities
(Landsmannschaften). These were asked to contribute a minimum of $
2,000, which would be matched by JDC. Up to 1938, 250 Landsmannschaften
responded, and rather large amounts of JDC money went out to match
these small grants.
The expenditure was under the surveillance of CEKABE.
In 1937 some 5,000 families were helped by these small ventures, which
included such branches as mechanical weaving (at Choroszcz), carpenter
cooperatives (Tarnopol), saddler's cooperatives (Chelm), and
semiagricultural pursuits, such as vegetable farming, the planting of
medicinal herbs, and the like.
[CEKABE helps families and
artisans - JDC help for families - 1 mio. Jews at or beyond the edge of
starvation]
Another venture of CEKABE was the establishment of small dairies on the
outskirts of towns. This work was carried on in 1938. There were 2,088
families that were helped in this way in the first (p.200)
half of the year, but we lack information for the rest of the period,
up to the outbreak of the war.
(End note 60: 46-report 1938. In 1937 Jacob Lestschinsky produced an
industrialization plan of Polish Jewry for Simon Marks, which was based
on the same principles as Kahn's plans: "Not to save the weak and
unsound, but to fortify and strengthen the sound and secure positions."
The plan would cost $ 4 mio., of which $ 3 mio. would come from abroad.
See 44-21, Committee on Poland, 12/9/37 [9 December 1937])
By early 1938 Kahn had accumulated sufficient experience to decide that
the experiment had been worthwhile. In January of the year [1938] he
demanded a yearly allocation of $ 1 million for this kind of economic
reconstruction, and hoped that within five years this would lead to the
employment of 23,000 families. It can safely be estimated that up to
the end of 1938 JDC had succeeded in finding new employment in these
enterprises for about 10,000 families.
This in itself was a partial success, and JDC could justly be proud of
it. Yet measured by the economic decline of the Jewish population in
Poland and by the fact that
about one
million people there were living
at or beyond the edge of starvation, the outcome of the efforts
was
small indeed. The basic problem of JDC was that with its relatively
small resources it could do no more than help those who were above the
danger line from sinking below it. JDC was not a government, and it
could not solve the problem of the starving million.
For a few years JDC was helped in its efforts by the British Jews. In
1935 British Jews sent close to 40,000 pounds (almost $ 200,000) to
Poland, to be distributed by JDC. This was repeated in 1936. But in
1937 the pro-Zionist and non-Zionist wings in Britain disagreed on aid
to Poland, the Zionists favoring such aid. Collections went down, and
no more real help was obtained. The help of the British Jews, while it
lasted, was important from another angle. JDC and ICA (primarily a
British organization) had been very interested in vocational
retraining. JDC saw this as one of its main tasks.
