[C.] Evian
[conference summer 1938]
[6.7. Evian Conference in July 1938 - Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees (ICR) set up]
[Many countries don't want the
Jewish problem - farmers for South America possible - other countries
follow the "USA" and do not rise their quotas]
At the conference itself, held at Evian, France, between July 6 and
July 15, 1938, two main ideas seem to have been in the minds of Taylor
and George L. Warren, his executive secretary and chief aide:
-- to try to get countries of immigration to make liberal immigration
declarations,
-- and to establish international machinery (directed mainly by the
U.S.) that would enter into negotiations with Germany.
There were difficulties on both points, however. The statements of the
various representatives were discouraging and often tinged with
anti-Semitism.
For example, the Australian representative declared that "as we have no
real racial problem we are not desirous of importing one". Latin
American delegates were very restrained - a few countries, like Brazil,
Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Peru, offered some prospect
for the immigration of agricultural workers or farmers. All made a
special point of declaring that no merchants or intellectuals would be
allowed in.
Nowhere was special legislation to allow immigration being
contemplated, and of course in this matter the U.S. example was being
followed.
[GB and Commonwealth states:
Palestine closed - possible emigration to East Africa possible]
Britain's representative, Lord Winterton, declared that Palestine was
temporarily closed to large-scale immigration until a political
solution was found. However, he declared, there were prospects for
settling refugees in Kenya and other parts of East Africa.
(End note 30:
The official protocols of the Evian Conference are kept
in 9-28. Winterton said, 7/15/38 [15 July 1938], on Palestine:
"Il
est apparu indispensable, non pas sans doute l'interrompre
l'immigration juive - ce qui n'a jamais été envisagé - mais de
l'assujettir à certaines restrictions d'un caractère purement
temporaire et exceptionnel, ayant pour but de maintenir, dans les
limites raisonnables, la population dans les rapports numériques
actuel, en attendant une décision définitive ... relativement à
l'avenir politique du pays" -
[Translation: "It seems to be indispensable, no, without any doubt to
interrupt the Jewish immigration - what never had been in project - but
to subject to certain restrictions of an absolute temporary and
exceptional character, for a definitive decision ... relatively for the
political future of the country"]
a clear foreshadowing of the British move away from the partition
proposal of 1937 toward the 1939 White Paper on Palestine. See
-- Morse, op. cit. [Morse, Arthur D.: While Six Million Died; New York
1968], pp. 212-13;
-- Wyman, op. cit. [Wyman, David S.: Paper Walls; Amherst, Mass.,
1968], pp. 49-50, and
-- Mashberg, op. cit. [Mashberg, Michael: America and the Refugee
Crisis; M.A. thesis; City University of New York, 1970])
This declaration was "an unexpected and welcome gesture."
(End note 31: 9-27, Brotman to Laski, no date [July 1938?])
Britain (p.233)
itself, Winterton said, was not a country of immigration. Yet the
people of the United Kingdom were ready to play their part within the
narrow limits feasible, given the high degree of industrialization and
the large number of unemployed in Britain.
[European representatives state
the Jews have to go overseas - little countries only want to be
temporary havens]
European countries emphasized the necessity for emigration overseas,
but Holland and Denmark stressed their relatively liberal policies as
transit countries. Speaking for Switzerland, which had refused to play
host to the conference, the police chief, Dr. Rothmund, insisted that
his country could only be a temporary stopover en route to other places.
(End note 32: See note 30 above and: Ludwig, op. cit. [Ludwig, Carl:
Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Schweiz seit 1933
bis zur Gegenwart. Bericht an den Bundesrat [The refugee policy of
Switzerland since 1933 to the present]; Zurich, no date [1957], p. 84,
footnote 1)
["US" delegate Taylor states that
the machinery of emigration has to begin]
Taylor himself had no illusions regarding the prospect of getting
public governmental declarations welcoming refugees. Although insisting
in his opening speech that governments must act promptly on the refugee
question, he also said that probably no more "could be expected than
that the conference should put into motion the
machinery and correlate it with
existing machinery that will, in the long run, contribute to a
practical amelioration of the condition."
(End note 33: 9-28, and Wyman, op. cit. [Wyman, David S.: Paper Walls;
Amherst, Mass., 1968], pp. 49-50)
[Jewish Refugees with special
education are accepted in some countries - prepare the refugees]
The declarations, while far from satisfactory, were not quite as
negative as press criticism at the time and historical accounts since
then would have us believe. While we have seen that some countries of
potential refuge refused to consider immigration, others were willing
to accept people under certain conditions. It was therefore a matter of
providing refugees with sufficient means to make their immigration to
those countries attractive to the governments concerned.
(End note 34: 9-28, Brotman memo, 7/16/38 [16 July 1938]; According
to Brotman, who represented the British Board of Deputies,
representatives of governments were apt to be more liberal privately
than in public speeches).
This was by no means easy to achieve.
[GB and France want the Jewish
refugee discussion only in the League of Nations]
Britain and France were reluctant to have the refugee question taken
out of the League of Nations, where their influence was paramount.
[Malcolm appeals for government
funds for emigration - large emigration does not seem to be possible]
Sir Neil Malcolm, the League of Nations high commissioner for refugees,
displeased the Americans by stating that government funds were needed
and that private organizations could not possibly bear the burden. He
also spoke his mind regarding the attitude of the governments and
declared that "large-scale immigration and settlement ... presently
appear impossible."
(End note 35: New York Times, 7/9/38 [9 July 1938])
Warren termed his speech "not helpful".
(End note 36: CON-2, Warren to Chamberlain, 7/9/38 [9 July 1938])
[Plan for an Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees (ICR)]
In the end, however, the British and French agreed to the setting up of
an Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR), which (p.234)
would be located in London; presumably ICR would swallow up the League
committee under Malcolm.
[Polish and Romanian Jewish
problems are not discussed at Evian conference!]
These were not the only problems raised at Evian. Poland and Romania
tried to have the conference deal with the emigration of their Jewish
populations, but the delegations from Britain and France very
energetically rejected all such attempts. The discussions were limited
to the subject of persons - termed "involuntary emigrants" - who might
be forced out of Germany and Austria in the future and those who had
already left but had found no satisfactory place of permanent residence
(their number was estimated at 30,000).
Only in the long run was it proposed to deal with larger aspects of the
question, thus including the emigration problem of East European Jewry.
[So, all European Yiddish Jews are excluded from discussion...]
The delegations of German and Austrian Jews, prodded by the Gestapo to
make clear to the conferees the necessity of finding havens quickly,
made a considerable impression.
(End note 37: For a fictionalized but essentially true account, see:
Hans Habe: The Mission; New York 1966)
[Speeches from the Jewish
organizations of the "free countries" - chaos and no collaboration]
The Jewish organizations from the free countries, about 21 of them,
presented a spectacle of disunity and confusion. The Liaison Committee,
under Norman Bentwich, drew up a statement, but the individual groups
would not forgo their right to make separate appearances; as a result a
large number of speeches were made, more or less repeating each other.
(End note 38: See note 31 above [End note 31: 9-27, Brotman to Laski,
no date [July 1938?]; Brotman added that Winterton's secretary was
"doing her best to tell Lord Winterton that all Jews are not like those
at the conference." The remark reveals the Briton's anti-Semitic
instincts and the British Jew's feeling of inferiority rather than the
failings of the Jewish organizations).
Jonah B. Wise represented JDC at Evian, and his presentation on July 14
was really a summary of what JDC had achieved up to that time. He
emphasized that JDC's resources were limited and based on voluntary
contributions, and that it was necessary that the emigrants be able to
take out some of their own capital.
["USA" and JDC want to press GB to
reopen Palestine for Jewish mass immigration]
In official American eyes the role of JDC was quite important. Prior to
Evian, JDC leaders had been invited to an informal meeting with Warren,
Prof. Joseph P. Chamberlain, and James G. McDonald, where stress was
laid on the pressure that would be brought to bear on Britain to get
her to open her possessions to refugee settlement. The point was made
that if the British hold back, "they may hurt their present
relationship with our government".
(End note 39: 9-27, informal meeting, 6/3/38 [3 June 1938])
[Arabs and Palestinians are not asked...]
[WJC Goldmann is plain-talking]
It must be stressed that only the World Jewish Congress, represented
(p.235)
by Dr. Nahum Goldman, disregarded the appeals for moderation.
-- It [WJC] sharply attacked German practices,
-- demanded that the Jewish problem be viewed as a whole,
-- said that Jews fleeing from Eastern Europe should also be helped,
-- and insisted that uncultivated areas be set aside for Jewish
settlement.
-- Also, WJC thought that government financing was indispensable
because private agencies would not be able to support the emigration by
themselves.
[The Evian results: In fact no big
result - ICR is set up under director Rublee]
JDC was not displeased with the outcome of Evian. In a telephone
conversation with Baerwald on July 14, McDonald declared that he was
"satisfied they accomplished everything that could be expected under
the circumstances."
(End note 40: Ibid. [9-27, informal meeting], McDonald to Baerwald
(telephone), 7/14/38 [14 July 1938])
Baerwald agreed. It must be remembered that JDC was privy to Taylor's
intentions at the conference to have the U.S. set up ICR, whose task it
should be, as Taylor constantly reiterated, to negotiate with the
Germans. JDC was sympathetic to this line of thought. Its Paris
secretary, Nathan Katz, was asked to prepare for and take part in the
discussions at the first ICR meeting in London on August 3, 1938.
Taylor's statement on that occasion had been prepared "in Paris with
the cooperation of Dr. Kahn and myself", as Katz wrote.
(End note 41: Ibid. [9-27, informal meeting], Katz to Baerwald, 8/9/38
[9 August 1938])
Typically, the number of people who would have to be dealt with by ICR
in Germany was put at 660,000; this included all persecuted
"non-Aryans" and other gentiles, so that the Jewish aspect could be
toned down as much as possible.
[and this probably included Austria, because Austria had become
Germany. But there is no indication].
A small administrative budget, to be paid to ICR by the governments,
was agreed to after some haggling, and George Rublee, an American
lawyer, was elected director - in fact, prospective negotiator with
Germany. An assistant director, Robert Pell, was loaned from the State
Department, indicating that these proceedings were considered to be of
some importance for American diplomacy.
(End note 42:
-- Morse, op. cit. [Morse, Arthur D.: While Six Million Died; New York
1968], pp. 218-19;
-- Wyman, op. cit. [Wyman, David S.: Paper Walls; Amherst, Mass.,
1968], pp. 51-52)
JDC leadership tended to regard the very fact of American and
international involvement in the refugee problem as a great step
forward. Kahn wrote about "the message of the Evian Conference, the
significance of a great gathering which solemnly affirmed the initial
responsibility of humanity in the solution of the problems of the
refugees." (p.236)
(End note 43: Executive Committee, Kahn to Budget and Scope Committee,
9/18/38 [18 September 1938])
As a result of the Evian Conference most governments adopted a "wait
and see" attitude. The immediate results of the conference amounted to
nothing. (p.239)
